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A Diachronic Approach to Bob Jones:
Religious Tax Exemptions After Obergefell
SAMUEL D. BRUNSON* & DAVID J. HERZIG†
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an entity may
lose its tax exemption if it violates a fundamental public policy, even where religious
beliefs demand that violation. In that case, the Court held that racial discrimination
violated fundamental public policy. Could the determination to exclude same-sex individuals from marriage or attending a college also be considered a violation of
fundamental public policy? There is uncertainty in the answer. In the recent Obergefell v. Hodges case that legalized same-sex marriage, the Court asserted
that LGBT individuals are entitled to “equal dignity in the eyes of the law.” Constitutional law scholars, such as Laurence Tribe, are advocating that faith groups might
lose their status, citing that this decision is the dawning of a new era of constitutional
doctrine in which fundamental public policy will have a more broad application.
Regardless of whether Obergefell marks a shift in fundamental public policy, that
shift will happen at some point. The problem is, under the current diachronic
fundamental-public-policy regime, tax-exempt organizations have no way to know,
ex ante, what will violate a fundamental public policy. We believe that the purpose
of the fundamental-public-policy requirement is to discourage bad behavior in advance, rather than merely to punish it after it occurs. As a result, we believe that the
government should clearly delineate a manner for determining what constitutes a
fundamental public policy. We recommend three safe harbor regimes that would allow religiously affiliated tax-exempt organizations to know what kinds of discrimination are incompatible with tax exemption. Tying the definition of fundamental public policy to strict scrutiny, to the Civil Rights Act, or to equal protection allows a
tax-exempt entity to ensure compliance, ex post. In the end, though, we believe that
the flexibility attendant to equal protection, mixed with the nimbleness that the Treasury Department would enjoy in crafting a blacklist of prohibited discrimination,
would provide the best and most effective safe harbor regime.
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges,1 opponents of same-sex marriage have been
asking how the Supreme Court’s decision will affect religious liberty. 2 On its face,
this juxtaposition of same-sex marriage and religious liberty seems alarmist and far
outside the contours of the decision. After all, religions should be free to determine
the tenets of their faith, including whether or not to perform same-sex marriages.3
But could government put undue pressure on religions and religiously affiliated
organizations, post-Obergefell, through, for example, the tax law? 4 There is a real
concern that if religious institutions refuse to embrace same-sex marriage, they will

1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. See Dennis Romboy, A Look at the ‘12 Religious Freedom Grenades’ Launched by
the Supreme Court Decision on Marriage, DESERET NEWS (July 7, 2015, 4:10 PM), http://
national.deseretnews.com/article/5096/a-look-at-the-12-religious-freedom-grenades8217
-launched-by-the-supreme-court-decision-on-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/9HZF-HV7W].
3. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963); Russell K. Robinson, Unequal
Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 205 (2016); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its
Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 16, 30–31 (2015); Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?:
Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 176 (2015).
4. See, e.g., David J. Herzig & Samuel D. Brunson, Tax Exemption, Public Policy, and
Discriminatory Fraternities, 35 VA. TAX REV. 116, 116 (2015) [hereinafter Herzig & Brunson,
Tax Exemption] (arguing that the IRS should reject tax exemptions of social clubs “if there is
disparate impact, at minimum as to race, in their policies”); David J. Herzig & Samuel D.
Brunson, Subsidized Injustice: Racist Fraternities and Sororities Should Have Their TaxExempt Status Revoked, SLATE (Mar. 13, 2015, 10:31 AM), http://www.slate.com
/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/03/racist_fraternities_sororities_and_universi
ties_should_have_their_tax_exempt.html [https://perma.cc/6P9Y-XDXV]; David J. Herzig,
Donald Trump Suggests He Was Audited Because of His ‘Strong Christian Faith.’ Here’s Why
That’s Unlikely, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/02/26/donald-trump-suggests-he-was-audited-because-of-his-strong
-christian-faith-heres-why-thats-unlikely/ [https://perma.cc/D32Q-7U74]. But see Peter J.
Reilly, Don’t Sic IRS on Racist Frat Boys, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2015, 9:43 AM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2015/03/16/dont-sick-irs-on-racist-frat-boys/ [https://perma.cc
/439H-E8YW].
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lose their tax exemptions.5 And that risk is not necessarily hypothetical: a significant
number of tax-exempt organizations, many of which are affiliated with religions,
continue to discriminate against LGBT individuals,6 notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s assertion that LGBT individuals are entitled to “equal dignity in the eyes of
the law.”7
On its surface, of course, Obergefell says nothing about private discrimination
based on sexual orientation. The litigants in Obergefell disagreed on a narrow and
well-defined question: whether states could constitutionally deny marriage to samesex couples.8 The Court decided that there was a fundamental right to marry and
rejected the various states’ prohibitions on same-sex marriage.9 The obligations of
states to perform marriages, however, cannot be generalized to churches. The fundamental right the majority recognizes is a right against the state. 10 In fact, Justice
Kennedy explicitly acknowledged that “religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine
precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.”11 Churches, according to
Justice Kennedy, continue to be secure in their right to understand for themselves
God’s law.
Despite the narrow focus on state obligations, almost instantly the discussion of
legalized same-sex marriage became wrapped up in, and to some extent confused
with, questions of religious freedom and tax policy. Even in his dissent, Chief Justice
Roberts cautioned that “the tax exemptions of some religious institutions would be
in question if they opposed same-sex marriage. . . . Unfortunately, people of faith
can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today.”12

5. See, e.g., Mark Oppenheimer, Now’s the Time To End Tax Exemptions for Religious
Institutions, TIME (June 28, 2015), http://time.com/3939143/nows-the-time-to-end-tax
-exemptions-for-religious-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/AG9F-UE7B]; Felix Salmon, Does
Your Church Ban Gay Marriage? Then It Should Start Paying Taxes, FUSION (June 29, 2015,
12:24 PM), http://fusion.net/story/158096/does-your-church-ban-gay-marriage-then-it-should
-start-paying-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/T547-KKXL]; Eugene Volokh, Religious Exemptions
—A Guide for the Confused, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 24, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/24/religious-exemptions
-a-guide-for-the-confused/ [https://perma.cc/49PM-2VN4].
6. For example, more than 100 private religiously affiliated schools in Georgia have explicit policies prohibiting LGBT students from attending. Kim Severson, Backed by State
Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/education/georgia-backed-scholarships-benefit-schools
-barring-gays.html [https://perma.cc/ZWL6-BM55].
7. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015); cf. United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate
that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the
States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal
statute.”).
8. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
9. Id. at 2607.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent follows the reasoning of Justice Alito who, during
oral arguments, asked whether the rule endorsed in Bob Jones13 would cause schools
that oppose same-sex marriage to lose their exemptions. 14 Solicitor General Verrilli
replied that it was “certainly going to be an issue.”15
Is Justice Kennedy correct? Or do religions need to worry about the eventuality
that Chief Justice Roberts points to? Those who worry that Obergefell threatens
conservative religions’ tax exemptions may sound alarmist.16 There certainly are
same-sex marriage supporters who argue that religious organizations that oppose
same-sex marriage should lose their exemptions.17 They assert that, if a religion opposes same-sex marriage, the government “should certainly not bend over backwards
to give [it] the privilege of tax exemption.”18
Moreover, there is a growing view that Obergefell represents not the end of an era
but a dawning of a new era of constitutional doctrine. This view has been adopted
and espoused by such eminent constitutional law scholars as Kenji Yoshino and
Laurence Tribe. In Professor Tribe’s recent essay,19 he stated we are now entering a
new era of protections for previously marginalized groups. He calls this view of
constitutional protections “equal dignity.”20 Justice Kennedy, according to Professor
Tribe, “tightly wound the double helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a
doctrine of equal dignity.”21 If Professor Tribe is correct, then the subsidiary
questions regarding religious freedom asked by the dissent will need to be answered.

13. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577 (1983) (mapping a public policy
exception on to the tax-exempt rules which would provide “private schools that prescribe and
enforce racially discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine” fail to
qualify as tax-exempt organizations).
14. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-556q1_7l48.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2BNZ-EN3J].
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., W. James Antle III, How the Supreme Court’s Gay Marriage Ruling Could
Destroy the United Methodist Church, WEEK (July 2, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/564067
/how-supreme-courts-gay-marriage-ruling-could-destroy-united-methodist-church [https://perma
.cc/C8QD-WS2L]; David Lauter, Will a Religious Institution Lose Tax-Exempt Status for
Refusing To Marry a Same-Sex Couple?, L.A. TIMES, (June 26, 2015), http://www.latimes
.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-tax-exemptions-religious-20150626-story.html [https://perma
.cc/Q5A5-JWPY]; Team Fix, The CNN-Telemundo Republican Debate Transcript, Annotated,
WASH. POST: THE FIX (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the
-fix/wp/2016/02/25/the-cnntelemundo-republican-debate-transcript-annotated/ [https://perma
.cc/SQX7-FHEC] ( “[Question of Hugh Hewitt to Donald Trump]: Mr. Trump, Senator Cruz
mentioned the issue that keeps me up at night, which is religious liberty. Churches, Catholic
and Christian colleges, Catholic adoption agencies—all sorts of religious institutions fear that
Hobby Lobby, if it’s repealed, it was a five-four decision, they’re going to have to bend their
knee and provide morning-after pills. They fear that if Bob Jones is expanded, they will lose
their tax exemption.”).
17. Salmon, supra note 5.
18. Salmon, supra note 5; accord Oppenheimer, supra note 5.
19. Tribe, supra note 3.
20. Id. at 17
21. Id.
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Even if Obergefell marks the beginning of a constitutional equal-dignity regime,
it is not altogether clear that the law changes substantively. Although the repercussions could be manifold, here we intend to explore how Obergefell affects the taxexempt status of churches and religiously affiliated schools that continue to discriminate on the basis of sexuality. Like the Solicitor General at oral arguments, both
those who fear and those who celebrate the potential loss of exemption by religious
institutions skip over the hard work of figuring out how the public policy rule would
apply to churches and other religiously affiliated organizations that discriminate on
the basis of sexuality.22 Instead, they merely assume that it will apply and that these
religious organizations can and will lose their exemptions.
This Article will focus on this intersection between the First Amendment and the
tax law. Congress clearly has the authority to remove entities—including religious
entities—from the purview of the tax law. Whether the IRS must remove an entity
(e.g., whether the tax exemption is a subsidy) is not a particularly relevant inquiry
for our discussion. We instead are focusing on the specific question derived from the
Supreme Court that an organization can lose its tax exemption if it violates a
fundamental public policy, even where religious beliefs demand that violation. The
fundamental public policy rule is a diachronic concept, and it is not clear how
Obergefell, or Professor Tribe’s proposed equal dignity regime, affects its application. We try to answer that question.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the lens in which Tribe and
Yoshino view Obergefell. In this Part, we do not endorse their interpretation of
Obergefell as necessarily correct. Rather, we use their interpretation as a jumpingoff point to revisit the basis of denial of tax-exempt status for violation of public
policy. Part II then articulates the current tax standards applied to churches and religiously affiliated schools, including the structural limitations of the tax exemption.
Those observations motivate a further inquiry into what constitutes a fundamental
public policy. Part III takes a pragmatic approach by applying the existing standard
to tax exemptions for religion and religiously based educational organizations.
Together, Parts II and III make a case for a legislative solution to the problem. Part
IV then pivots to consider the future of the fundamental public policy if Obergefell

22. Among other things, whether and how the public policy rule applies to religious
organizations must rely on a theory of why religious organizations are exempt. Otherwise,
asserting that they should or should not be subject to the rule is merely that: an assertion. Cf.
Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want To Develop Rules Regarding Charities and Politics,
62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 673–74 (2012) (arguing that the IRS should develop bright-line
rules to encourage compliance); Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78
YALE L.J. 1285, 1288 (1969) (arguing that tax-exempt organizations are not part of the tax
base); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 305–06, 357–58 (1976) (“The exemption of
nonprofit organizations from federal income taxation is neither a special privilege nor a hidden
subsidy. Rather, it reflects the application of established principles of income taxationto
organizations which, unlike the typical business corporation, do not seek profit.”); Daniel
Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 133 (2006) (questioning
Bittker’s premise that there are no owners of charity); David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation
of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451, 515 (2014) (proposing to
eliminate tax exemption if organization fails certain tests).
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is indeed the beginning of a more holistic approach by the Supreme Court. This Part
shows the limitations of the fundamental public policy doctrine and considers three
tiers of examination as proxies for the standard of fundamental public policy as
established by the Supreme Court in Bob Jones. Ultimately, it finds all of those
standards flawed in some manner once again begging for a legislative remedy.
I. POST-OBERGEFELL EQUAL DIGNITY
In June 2015 the Supreme Court decided the Obergefell case, holding that samesex couples had a fundamental right to marriage. 23 The case represented an important
enumeration of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court’s opinion has been subject to critical praise. The result the Court
reached was praised; yet, the criticism has come from the legal reasoning the Court
used to achieve the result.24 For example, scholars questioned the majority position
for failing to make sexual orientation a suspect class. 25
A. Expansive View of Obergefell
Two prominent constitutional law scholars have taken an alternative approach to
the naysayers, arguing that their criticism misses the point. Professor Kenji Yoshino
began the discussion of placing Obergefell in context of the larger constitutional
framework.26 Professor Yoshino, rather than focusing on the language of the opinion,
demonstrated how the opinion “represents the culmination of a decades-long project
that has revolutionized the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence.”27
According to Yoshino, the Obergefell opinion is the move away from the current
Glucksberg28 three-prong test that dominated the Court’s jurisprudence in the
1990s.29 The move returns the jurisprudential test of the Fourteenth Amendment to
Justice Harlan’s holistic inquiry first articulated in the 1960s dissent in Poe v.
Ullman.30
Poe dealt with a criminal ban on contraception. 31 The Court avoided deciding the
case on grounds that the case was nonjusticiable because of either standing or

23. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); Tribe, supra note 3, at 16;
Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: Judicial Process and the Last Stand Against
Marriage Equality in the Land of George Wallace, 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 (2015);
Yoshino, supra note 3, at 147.
24. Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of Marriage, 6
CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 107, 107 (2015).
25. Peter Nicolas, Obergefell’s Squandered Potential, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 137, 139
(2015).
26. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 147.
27. Tribe, supra note 3, at 16; accord Yoshino, supra note 3, at 148.
28. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
29. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 148–51.
30. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 498 (plurality opinion); Yoshino, supra note 3, at 149.
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ripeness.32 The Court relied on a formalistic approach to the ripeness question, ignoring any due process analysis. A plurality of the Court decided that because the state
had never begun a prosecution under the statute, the issue was not ripe. 33
Justice Harlan rejected the majority avoidance of the issue by stating that the
statute was ripe to decide on the merits.34 Justice Harlan created a more open-ended
approach to due process jurisprudence that “weighed individual liberties against
governmental interests in a reasoned manner.”35 Justice Harlan was advocating for
unshackling due process jurisprudence from the tradition because the “tradition was
itself ‘a living thing.’”36
Justice Harlan’s approach was, obviously, rejected in the case and after the early
1970s mostly abandoned as a mode of inquiry. 37 Until Obergefell, the formalistic
approach continued to gain a stronger foothold, culminating with the decision of
Washington v. Glucksberg.38 The Glucksberg approach adopted by the Court tied due
process liberty to tradition and required a “‘careful description’ of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest.”39 The test established by Glucksberg is a three-prong
test involving tradition, specificity, and negative inquiry.40
Professor Yoshino situates Obergefell in the larger Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence and signals a potential shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence. By
Justice Kennedy harking back to Poe, “it will be much harder to invoke Glucksberg
as binding precedent.”41 Thus, from Professor Yoshino’s perspective, Obergefell retains Glucksberg’s requirements of “tradition.”42 The difference, in Yoshino’s opinion, is that tradition is a much less prevalent factor than under Glucksberg.
The dissent in Obergefell recognized this goal of Justice Kennedy’s shift. Justice
Alito addressed the issue head on by stating that “only those rights that are ‘“deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”’” should be upheld under the Due
Process Clause.43 This required the majority in Obergefell to respond to the dissent’s
concern regarding untethering the standard from the objective Glucksberg rule.
“Without an ostensibly constraining test like the one proposed by Glucksberg, these
conservatives worry, substantive due process will run riot, with outcome-driven
judges inventing new fundamental rights as it strikes their fancy.”44 Yoshino dismisses the conservative comparison of Obergefell to Lochner, through a limiting

32. Poe, 367 U.S. at 503–09; Yoshino, supra note 3, at 149.
33. Poe, 367 U.S. at 508; see also Andrew B. Schroeder, Keeping Police Out of the Bedroom: Justice John Marshall Harlan, Poe v. Ullman, and the Limits of Conservative Privacy,
86 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1045–46 (2000).
34. Poe, 367 U.S. at 522–24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 150.
36. Id. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
37. Tribe, supra note 3, at 16.
38. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
39. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
40. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 162.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 162–63.
43. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
44. Tribe, supra note 3, at 17–18.
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lens.45 By only applying the broader rule when a group demonstrates subordination,
the Lochner comparison can be avoided. For example, Obergefell was to address the
subordination of LGBT individuals in the context of marriage. 46 Professor Yoshino
defines this constraint as an “antisubordination principle.”47 This is a cautious way
to cast Obergefell as a shift from Glucksberg to Poe.
Professor Tribe then advances Professor Yoshino’s interpretation of Obergefell
through a view of the decision in even more expansive terms. 48 He argues “that
Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound the double
helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity.”49 Under
this view, Obergefell is not the last word on this issue, but the first.
The new orthodoxy that Professor Tribe envisions after Obergefell is one that
protects “all individuals . . . against the specter of coerced conformity.”50 He provides
examples of how equal dignity would play out on a go-forward basis. For example,
equal dignity would portend the end of discrimination based on sexual orientation in
areas like employment or housing. 51
Most importantly for our purposes, he provides an example of how equal dignity
would apply to Kim Davis’s opposition to marriage equality. 52 Kim Davis is a
Kentucky county clerk who would not issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples
because it violated her religious dogma. 53 The federal court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky issued an order compelling her to issue licenses.54 She continued to defy
the court by not issuing any licenses.55 At that time, she was jailed for contempt, and
her clerks issued licenses that may or may not be valid under Kentucky law.56
Professor Tribe argues that the Obergefell decision does nothing to limit

45. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 170–71.
46. Tribe, supra note 3, at 18; Yoshino, supra note 3, at 175.
47. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 179.
48. Tribe, supra note 3, at 19.
49. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
51. Id. The government has begun to hint that it is moving this direction. In March 2016,
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission announced that it had filed its first two
“sex discrimination suits based on sexual orientation.” Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Files First Suits Challenging Sexual Orientation Discrimination
as Sex Discrimination, Mar. 1, 2016, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom
/release/3-1-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/F22E-QTW8].
52. Tribe, supra note 3, at 30; David J. Herzig & Faisal Kutty, The Kim Davis Debacle
Exposes the Limits of Religious Liberty, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2015, 5:05 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-herzig/kim-davis-law-religion_b_8124466.html [https://
perma.cc/8FNS-KBB9].
53. Herzig & Kutty, supra note 52.
54. Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail over Deal on Samesex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis
-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PBN6-V6HA].
55. Id.
56. Sandhya Somashekhar, Judge: Kim Davis May Keep Her Name off Marriage
Licenses, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post
-nation/wp/2016/02/10/judge-kim-davis-may-keep-her-name-off-marriage-licenses/ [https://
perma.cc/GBW4-SWFV].
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individuals’ First Amendment rights to voice their personal objections. 57 Whether
they are an agent of the government or not is inconsequential. However, the doctrine
of equal dignity would “prohibit[] them from acting on those objections . . . in a way
that demeans or subordinates LGBT individuals and their families by preventing
them from giving legal force to their marriage vows.”58
Through the lens of Professors Tribe and Yoshino, Obergefell represents the
beginning of a new constitutional paradigm. Through this approach, the Fourteenth
Amendment becomes more prominent. Unlike most of the critique of the decision,
Professors Tribe and Yoshino seem to be framing Obergefell within the historic jurisprudence and within the context of dissents.
B. Support of Expansive View Through Oral Argument and Decision
Plenty of anecdotal evidence exists supporting the way in which Tribe and
Yoshino situate Obergefell. The larger frame of Obergefell echoes the concerns of
dissenting Justices in both their opinions and oral arguments. During oral arguments,
the Justices picked up on the concern about the balance between the First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. 59 This priority manifests in two situations. The first is within the context of the religious freedom of churches themselves,
and the second is in the context of religious freedom for religiously affiliated
organizations, including schools.
Justice Scalia raised the first issue when he asked whether a minister would “not
have to conduct same-sex marriages.”60 Ms. Bonauto, the advocate for the Obergefell
plaintiffs, stated, “If they do not want to, that is correct. I believe that is affirmed
under the First Amendment.”61 Although under Professor Tribe’s analysis that is not
entirely clear.
Chief Justice Roberts raised the second issue. After restating that clergy would
not have to perform the same-sex marriage, he followed up with the harder question
of “[w]ould a religious school that has married housing be required to afford such
housing to same-sex couples?”62
Solicitor General Verrilli responded by deferring initially to the actual decision
the Court would render, which, according to Professor Tribe and Yoshino, is more
expansive than the Solicitor General expected during oral argument. 63 Then the
Solicitor General stated the answer would “depend on how States work out the balance between their civil rights laws . . . and how they decide what kinds of accommodations they are going to allow.”64
Pressing the issue, Justice Alito asked whether the rule endorsed in Bob Jones65

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Tribe, supra note 3, at 30.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 23 ll. 12–18.
Id. at 27 ll. 8–10.
Id. at 27 ll. 11–13.
Id. at 36 ll. 4–9.
Id. at 36–37.
Id.
461 U.S. 574 (1983); see supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
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would cause schools that oppose same-sex marriage to lose their exemptions. 66
Solicitor General Verrilli replied that it was “certainly going to be an issue.”67
The issues presented in the oral argument were echoed in the dissents of the
opinion. First, Chief Justice Roberts cautioned that “the tax exemptions of some
religious institutions would be in question if they opposed same-sex marriage. . . .
Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from
the majority today.”68 The majority decision disagreed, stating that
it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that,
by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling
and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations
to continue the family structure they have long revered.69
However, Professors Tribe and Yoshino do not take as narrow of a view. Under equal
dignity the religious organizations have freedom to determine the contours of their
faith. Nothing in the equal dignity analysis would impact the freedom of expression
nor the freedom of association. It is not until those beliefs bleed into the public sphere
that the constitutional doctrine would override that preference.
Their view seems to echo Chief Justice Robert’s dissent, in which he asserted that
[t]oday’s decision, for example, creates serious questions about religious
liberty. . . .
Respect for sincere religious conviction has [resulted in] accommodations for religious practice. The majority’s decision imposing samesex marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommodations. The
majority graciously suggests that religious believers may continue to
“advocate” and “teach” their views of marriage. The First Amendment
guarantees, however, the freedom to “exercise” religion. Ominously, that
is not a word the majority uses.70
Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that
[r]eligious liberty is about more than just the protection for “religious
organizations and persons . . . as they seek to teach the principles that are
so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths.” Religious liberty is
about freedom of action in matters of religion generally, and the scope
of that liberty is directly correlated to the civil restraints placed upon
religious practice.71

66. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 38.
67. Id.
68. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2607 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (majority opinion)).
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Justice Roberts follows up the specific example of religion with the second-order
problem facing religious schools.
Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways
that may be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage—
when, for example, a religious college provides married student housing
only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption agency
declines to place children with same-sex married couples. Indeed, the
Solicitor General candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of
some religious institutions would be in question if they opposed samesex marriage. There is little doubt that these and similar questions will
soon be before this Court. Unfortunately, people of faith can take no
comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today. 72
How would then equal dignity affect the tax exemptions of either religions or
religious based schools? We will next explore the rationale for the tax exemption. It
will become evident in the evolution of the boundaries of the exemption, that the
post-Obergefell view espoused by Professors Tribe and Yoshino could prove deleterious to discriminatory tax-exempt entities.
II. TAX-EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Even if Obergefell introduced equal dignity as a new constitutional principle, it
did not single-handedly eliminate homophobia and discrimination. 73 In the broader
legal landscape, there is no consistent impediment to private (as opposed to government) discrimination. Neither the federal government nor the governments of
nearly half of the states protects LGBT employees from discrimination based on their
sexual orientation, for example.74
And employment is not the only area of life where LGBT individuals can face
legal discrimination. According to the Southern Education Foundation, at least 115
private grade schools in Georgia have “explicit, severe anti-gay policies or belong to
state and national private school associations that promote anti-gay policies and
practices among their members.”75 At many of these schools, any student’s

72. Id. at 2625–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
73. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality:
The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099 (2015) (describing workplace discrimination
post-Obergefell); Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 136, 154 (2015);
Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Three Voices of Obergefell, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2015, at 28, 31;
David R. Wheeler, Gay Marriage and the Future of Evangelical Colleges, ATLANTIC (July 14,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/07/evangelical-colleges-struggle
-gay-marriage-ruling/398306/ [https://perma.cc/LY67-BJ3X].
74. Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations
and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 946 (2015).
75. S. EDUC. FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF: GEORGIA’S TAX DOLLARS HELP FINANCE PRIVATE
SCHOOLS WITH SEVERE ANTI-GAY POLICIES, PRACTICES, & TEACHINGS 1 (2013), http://www
.southerneducation.org/getattachment/857328be-3d6b-415f-af8b-da7bd3b75519/Georgia%E
2%80%99s-Tax-Dollars-Help-Finance-Private-Schools.aspx [https://perma.cc/6TLN-Z73M].
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homosexual actions or identity are sufficient for expulsion.76 At some, merely
supporting people who are LGBT will get a student expelled.77
Educational institutions’ discrimination against LGBT individuals is not,
moreover, limited to grade schools. Dozens of religiously affiliated colleges and
universities have policies that explicitly discriminate against gay students.78 At
Cedarville University in Ohio, for example, “the University prohibits same-sex dating behaviors,” and “patterns of disregard for University standards” constitutes
grounds for dismissal.79 The specter of dismissal is not merely hypothetical, either.
While no families of grade-school children who “have been expelled over sexual
orientation from a school that uses the tax scholarship program have come forward
in Georgia,”80 in 2013, Danielle Powell was expelled from Grace University for
“[s]exually immoral behavior, with a woman.”81
Even though federal law has not legally proscribed discrimination on the basis of
sexuality, religiously based institutions’ fears they will lose their tax exemptions do
not emerge out of nothing. In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Bob Jones, approved the
IRS’s revocation of two private schools’ tax exemptions on the basis that those
schools discriminated against African American students.82 In doing so, it endorsed
the extrastatutory public policy rule that the IRS had applied in determining whether
organizations qualified as tax-exempt.83 Under this rule, an organization that violates
an “established public policy” cannot qualify as tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of the Tax Code.84
Though the Supreme Court endorsed the public policy rule, it did little to clarify

76. Kim Severson, Backed by State Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring
Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/education
/georgia-backed-scholarships-benefit-schools-barring-gays.html [https://perma.cc/8J5C-Z5E9].
For example, the Cherokee Christian Schools student/parent handbook states that, “[i]n
accordance with the CCS Statement of Faith and in recognition of Biblical principles, no
‘immoral act’ or ‘identifying statements’ concerning fornication, adultery, homosexuality,
lesbianism, bisexuality, transgender desires, or pornography, will be tolerated. Such behavior
will constitute grounds for expulsion.” CHEROKEE CHRISTIAN SCH., ISSUE 2016.2,
STUDENT/PARENT HANDBOOK (CCHS) 22 (2016), https://www.cherokeechristian.org/wp
-content/uploads/2013/10/CCHS-Student-Handbook-2016-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/R736
-NF5W].
77. Severson, supra note 76.
78. Wheeler, supra note 73.
79. THE CEDARVILLE EXPERIENCE, 2015-16 STUDENT HANDBOOK 12, 25 (2015), http://
publications.cedarville.edu/brochures/studentlife/studenthandbook/files/assets/common/downloads
/publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/D429-UC2L].
80. Severson, supra note 76.
81. Allie Grasgreen, Expelled for Sexuality, and Sent a Bill, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 13,
2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/06/13/student-expelled-being-gay-and-charged
-6000-back-tuition-protests-online-petition [https://perma.cc/U374-JHSP].
82. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983).
83. Id. at 591–92.
84. Id. at 586; Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 523, 550 (2014) (describing the “established public policy” rule); Philip T. Hackney, A
Response to Professor Leff’s Tax Planning “Olive Branch” for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA
L. REV. BULL. 25, 31 (2014) (describing application of the “established public policy” rule).
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the rule’s scope.85 There is a real possibility that the Tribe and Yoshino view would
mean that the fundamental public policy rule should be expanded to include LGBT.
Therefore, before addressing the question of whether religions will lose their tax
exemptions as a result of opposing same-sex marriage, we must determine whether
churches are subject to the public policy doctrine and whether opposing same-sex
marriage violates an established public policy.
The Constitution requires little religious accommodation from the tax law. In spite
of special constitutional protections religion enjoys, 86 religious organizations have
no constitutional right to exemption from taxes. 87 In fact, religions do pay some
taxes, including the unrelated business income tax. 88 Courts have also recognized
that under certain circumstances, churches can lose their tax exemptions and become
subject to the federal income tax.89 It would appear to follow that a church that
violated the public policy doctrine—a bedrock requirement for tax exemption—
could lose its exemption and become taxable.
But does the United States have an established public policy of opposing
discrimination against same-sex marriage? Broadly speaking, the IRS has used the
public policy rule only in limited circumstances to revoke exemptions except where
a charity acts illegally or where a school discriminates on the basis of race.90 No taxexempt organization has ever lost its exemption, or been refused an exemption, for
discriminating on the basis of gender, national origin, or any other classification that
receives heightened scrutiny.91 Moreover, although the opinion in Obergefell is
slightly ambiguous, it does not appear to have added sexual orientation to the list of
protected classes.92 There is no reason, then, to believe that Obergefell somehow announces a public policy so extreme and so fundamental that churches opposing samesex marriage will be subject to losing their tax exemptions. This Part will examine
the evolution as well as the limitations of the doctrine.
A. Evolution of Public Policy Doctrine
Although Bob Jones has become an iconic case, a rare instance where
constitutional law and tax law meet, it did not emerge, fully formed, from the head
of the Supreme Court. Its holding reflected more than merely the procedural history
underlying the case—in its background was a long series of executive, legislative,
and judicial attempts to root out racial discrimination in United States education.

85. See David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public
Policy, and “Charity” in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 391 (2000).
86. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9.
87. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990).
88. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 67–68 (1969).
89. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
90. See Herzig & Brunson, Tax Exemption, supra note 4, at 129.
91. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (finding that
heightened scrutiny applies to laws that classify by race, national origin, alienage, or gender);
Herzig & Brunson, Tax Exemption, supra note 4, at 129.
92. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 24, at 113; Kyle C. Velte, Essay, Obergefell’s Expressive
Promise, 6 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF THE RECORD 157, 159 (2015).
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We have previously detailed the IRS’s history with private schools that
discriminated on the basis of race.93 While it is unnecessary here to recount the whole
history, it is instructive to look at how and why the IRS began revoking the
exemptions of discriminatory schools.
After the Supreme Court declared the “separate but equal” doctrine unconstitutional in 1954,94 some white parents turned to self-help to recreate racially
segregated education. If public schools were going to integrate, they would maintain
segregation by sending their children to discriminatory private schools. And because
the private schools were not state actors, the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis
did not prevent them from discriminating.
A decade later, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.95 A year later, the
IRS stopped processing exemption applications from segregated private schools. 96
For two years, it explored the legal issues attendant to exempting discriminatory
schools from the income tax.97 In 1967, the IRS unfroze the exemption process, announcing that it would no longer grant tax exemptions to discriminatory schools with
sufficient involvement with the state. 98 Where the school was private, though, and
did “not have such degree of involvement with the political subdivision as has been
determined by the courts to constitute State action for constitutional purposes,” the
IRS determined that it did not have authority to reject the school’s exemption
application.99
In response, a group of African American parents in Mississippi sued the IRS to
enjoin it from granting tax-exempt status to discriminatory schools. 100 The district
court granted their injunction, forbidding the IRS from approving applications for
tax exemption for discriminatory schools within its jurisdiction.101 The IRS proceeded to expand on the court’s order. Not only did it implement the policy nationwide, but it also implemented it retrospectively. 102 Henceforth, it would not approve
applications for exemption from discriminatory private schools, but it would also
look at private schools that had already obtained exemptions and, if they discriminated on the basis of race, would revoke their exemptions.
Still, a discriminatory private school will not automatically lose its exemption.
Before that could happen, two conditions precedent would have to occur. First, the
government would have to establish that eliminating discrimination against LGBT
individuals had become a fundamental public policy. Then the IRS would have to
choose to implement that policy by revoking discriminatory schools’ exemptions.

93. Herzig & Brunson, Tax Exemption, supra note 4, at 126–29.
94. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
95. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
96. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1970) (per curiam).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Internal Revenue Service Press Release, [1967] 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 6734 (Aug. 2, 1967)).
100. Id. at 1129.
101. Id. at 1140.
102. I.R.S. News Release, [1970] 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6790 (July 10, 1970).
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B. What Is a “Fundamental Public Policy,” Anyway?
While the Supreme Court held that the IRS could constitutionally revoke a taxexempt organization’s exemption if that organization violated a “fundamental public
policy,” it did not provide any guidance on what constituted a fundamental public
policy, the violation of which would warrant loss of exemption. 103
The Supreme Court did explain why it considered racially discriminatory private
schools as violating a fundamental public policy. Almost thirty years earlier, the
Supreme Court explained, it had determined in Brown v. Board of Education104 to
strike down as unconstitutional the separate-but-equal doctrine.105 The subsequent
“unbroken line of cases . . . establishe[d] beyond doubt this Court’s view that racial
discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public policy.”106
And it was not just the judicial branch. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964,107 and, from there, passed many additional laws that clearly demonstrated its
commitment to racial nondiscrimination. 108 The executive branch, through a series
of executive orders spanning several presidential administrations, also worked to
combat racial discrimination.109
Under the Supreme Court’s analysis, then, the question of whether racial
discrimination violated a fundamental public policy was easy. Three decades of
concerted effort by all three branches of the federal government demonstrated that
the government wanted to end racial discrimination and segregation. The Supreme
Court did not, however, say that three decades of concerted effort was necessary to
establish a fundamental public policy, only that it was sufficient.110 Outside of
clarifying that racial discrimination did violate fundamental public policy, the
Supreme Court provided the IRS with no guidance in determining what else violated
fundamental public policy.
In light of the lack of guidance, the IRS has responded almost exactly as it would
be expected to respond. By and large it has not revoked or denied exemptions on
public policy grounds. The exceptions fall broadly into two main categories: racial
discrimination and illegality.111

103. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983).
104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
105. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592–93.
106. Id. at 593.
107. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
108. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 594.
109. Id. at 594–95.
110. See id.
111. Nicholas A. Mirkay, Globalism, Public Policy, and Tax-Exempt Status: Are U.S.
Charities Adrift at Sea?, 91 N.C. L. REV. 851, 871 (2013). Professor Mirkay actually lays out
three public policy categories that the IRS will revoke or deny exemptions: “racial discrimination, civil disobedience, or certain illegal activity.” Id. The way the IRS has discussed civil
disobedience, though, suggests that it would better be categorized under the heading of illegal
activity.
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1. Racial Discrimination
Racial discrimination now represents an easy case for the IRS. The IRS has a long
history of denying tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools. 112 In
fact, even while recognizing that there was no federal law preventing private schools
from discriminating on the basis of race, the IRS determined that “the policy of the
United States is to discourage discrimination in such schools.”113 In furtherance of
this policy, the IRS refused to allow racially discriminatory schools to enjoy the
benefits of tax exemption.114
The IRS did more than merely revoke or deny the exemptions of discriminatory
private schools, though—it required schools to affirmatively disavow racial discrimination. In 1971, it announced that “a school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not ‘charitable’ within the common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code and in other relevant Federal
statutes and accordingly does not qualify as an organization exempt from Federal
income tax.”115 A year later, the IRS built on its requirement for racially
nondiscriminatory policies. For a private school to qualify as tax-exempt, it not only
had to have such a policy, but it also had to publicize the policy.116 Finally, the IRS
required evidence that the private school actually operated under its nondiscrimination policy.117
The Supreme Court explicitly adopted the IRS’s fundamental public policy rules
regarding racial discrimination.118 And the adoption of racial discrimination as
violating fundamental public policy, and therefore incompatible with a tax exemption, was not limited to the judicial branch. When a federal district court found that
private clubs could discriminate on the basis of race and keep their tax exemptions,119
Congress legislatively overruled the court, requiring that a club would not qualify as
tax-exempt if it had a written policy allowing for discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or religion.120 Each of the three branches of government recognized racial
discrimination as violative of public policy, and thus as preventing the tax exemption
of a discriminatory organization that would otherwise qualify as tax-exempt.
2. Illegality
Just as the Supreme Court recognized that opposing racial discrimination was not
the government’s sole public policy goal, the IRS has recognized that it can reach
beyond racial discrimination in evaluating whether an organization qualifies as

112. See, e.g., Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592; Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587; Rev. Proc.
72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834; Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
113. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. at 230.
114. I.R.S. News Release, supra note 102.
115. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. at 231.
116. Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834.
117. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. at 589–90.
118. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983).
119. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 458 (D.D.C. 1972).
120. Herzig & Brunson, Tax Exemption, supra note 4, at 131–32.
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exempt.121 But the only areas in which the IRS appears to have expanded the fundamental public policy reach have been in the area of illegality.
What kind of illegal behavior will the IRS deem to violate public policy? A wide
range, it turns out. In some cases, the illegality is both obvious and egregious. For
example, a hospital that violates the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Law, commonly known as the anti-kickback statute, does not qualify as tax-exempt
according to the IRS.122 Similarly, a cooperative formed to facilitate the sale of
marijuana between members (in violation of federal, though not state, law) did not
qualify for tax-exempt status because its illegal activities violated a fundamental
public policy.123
Though both examples represent significant violations of law, the IRS can invoke
the public policy requirement for less serious violations. In one case, it revoked the
exemption of a nonprofit animal shelter and sanctuary. 124 The president of the
organization had been convicted of misdemeanor cruelty to animals and later had
pleaded guilty to felony cruelty to animals. 125 Neither, though, appears to have been
the motivating factor in revoking the organization’s tax exemption; rather, the
organization had failed to file the required information reporting and had refused to
respond to IRS inquiries.126 Failure to file alone would have been sufficient for the
organization to lose its tax exemption.127 The IRS’s invocation of the public policy
requirement served as a backstop to its more technical disqualification for failure to
file a return. The fact that the public policy portion of the revocation serves principally as a backstop, combined with the lack of any guidance about the relevance of
whether a crime is a misdemeanor or a felony, means that the IRS’s decision here
provides almost no guidance about the contours of illegality and public policy.
In addition to the uncertainty that remains about whether the severity of a crime
affects whether it violates fundamental public policy, the IRS has muddied the waters
about whether, for public policy purposes, illegality is limited to illegal acts. In a
number of instances, the IRS has denied an organization’s exemption request, not
because the organization acts illegally, but because it advocates actions that would
violate the law. These violative actions range from promoting world peace through

121. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-10-001 (Mar. 10, 1989) (“Although applying on
its face only to race discrimination in education, the implication of the Bob Jones decision
extends to any organization claiming exempt status under section 501(c)(3) and to any activity
violating a clear public policy.”).
122. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991).
123. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-33-014 (Aug. 16, 2013). Interestingly, the marijuana
cooperative applied for an exemption under section 501(c)(16), not section 501(c)(3), of the
Code. Id. While the IRS imported the public policy requirement into section 501(c)(16), it is
not completely clear that it belongs there. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 84, at 536 (arguing that
the public policy requirement should not apply outside of section 501(c)(3)). But see Hackney,
supra note 84, at 26 (arguing that the public policy requirement applies beyond merely section
501(c)(3)).
124. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-37-039 (Sept. 12, 2008).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
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civil disobedience128 to educating the public about polygamy and empowering
polygamous families.129
In part, the fact that the IRS has not clarified the contours of the fundamental
public policy rule can be laid at the feet of the Supreme Court, which merely announced the rule, but also did not provide any guidance about how to determine what
constituted a fundamental public policy. 130 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bob Jones, moreover, the courts have done virtually nothing to clarify the
fundamental public policy rule.
That is not to say that courts have ignored the public policy rule—they mention it
frequently when adjudicating questions of the IRS’s wrongful denial or revocation
of an organization’s tax-exempt status.131 In the vast majority of cases that mention
the public policy rule, though, the opinion merely mentions public policy as one of
the requirements for tax exemption.132
Even where courts could easily and uncontroversially reach the question of
fundamental public policy, they remain hesitant to do so. In Mysteryboy
Incorporation v. Commissioner,133 for example, the Tax Court reviewed the IRS’s
denial of tax-exempt status to Mysteryboy. Mysterboy was formed to research “the
pros and cons of decriminalizing natural consensual sexual behaviors between adults

128. Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204. The group was not formed to actually break the
law, but it encouraged protestors to maximize their publicity by, among other things, blocking
traffic, disrupting government work, and “prevent[ing] the movement of supplies.” Id. at 204.
129. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-23-025 (June 7, 2013). Like in the Bob Jones case, the IRS
looked at the long history of criminalizing polygamy, and the judicial support for such laws,
to determine that polygamy violated a fundamental public policy. Id. It concluded that,
because the organization was “operated to condone and support those engaging in the illegal
act of polygamy,” it violated a fundamental public policy and did not qualify for exemption,
even though the organization itself did nothing illegal. Id.
130. The closest the Court comes to laying out a standard is acknowledging that
“contemporary standards must be considered in determining whether given activities provide
a public benefit and are entitled to the charitable tax exemption.” Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 593
n.20 (1983). But the Court fails to even explain what contemporary standard the IRS should
consider, much less how to use them to determine fundamental public policy.
131. A Westlaw search in the “All Federal” database on May 27, 2017, for advanced:
(revoke deny) & (“public policy” & “section 501(c)”) & DA(aft 05-24-1983) found 133
cases.
132. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir.
1987) (“Because we may affirm the Tax Court on this ground, we do not reach the questions
of whether the Church operated for a substantial commercial purpose or whether it violated
public policy.”); Educ. Assistance Found. for the Descendants of Hungarian Immigrants in the
Performing Arts, Inc. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 3d 34, 39 n.4 (D.D.C. 2015) (“While not
applicable in this case, the Court also notes that ‘[a]n organization that otherwise meets the
statutory requirements will nevertheless fail to qualify for tax-exempt status if its exemptionrelated activities violate public policy.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Airlie Found. v. IRS,
283 F. Supp. 58, 62 n.3 (D.D.C. 2003))); United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 109 T.C.
326, 382 (1997) (stating that, among the requirements for tax-exempt status, an organization’s
“purpose must not be ‘contrary to a fundamental public policy.’” (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983))), rev’d, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999); Variety Club
Tent No. 6 Charities, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485, 1491 (1997) (same).
133. 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1057 (2010).
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and underagers and decriminalizing what is defined as child pornography,” as well
as to lobby for such decriminalization.134 The IRS rejected Mysteryboy’s application
on the grounds that its purposes were “contrary to a fundamental public policy.”135
Although the Supreme Court never mentioned promoting pedophilia and child
pornography as violating a fundamental public policy, it seems like an uncontroversial classification. Federal law explicitly criminalized child pornography in
1977,136 and, in subsequent years, Congress broadened the scope of federal law.137
While the Tax Court ultimately upheld the IRS’s denial of tax-exempt status, though,
it did so on the basis that Mysteryboy had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating
that it was organized and operated for permissible purposes, not because it violated
a fundamental public policy.138
Similarly, in Synanon Church v. United States, the court reviewed the IRS’s
revocation of Synanon’s tax-exempt status.139 Synanon was originally founded to
rehabilitate drug addicts.140 It subsequently expanded into other endeavors, including
distributing farmers’ goods, developing real estate, performing investment
counseling, and training security forces. 141
Along with Synanon’s new business ventures, it appears to have engaged in both
fiscal improprieties and violence against its perceived enemies.142 The violence disturbed the judge, who found it “disturbing” and “serious.”143 Nonetheless, although
the IRS argued that fundamental public policy prohibited Synanon from qualifying
as tax-exempt, the court chose not to ground its opinion on public policy.144 Although
it believed that dictum in Bob Jones clearly indicated that applying the public policy
rule to Synanon’s violence “would have been proper,” it reluctantly declined to apply
the public policy rule.145 Rather, it found that Synanon’s suit had to be dismissed
(and the IRS’s revocation thus upheld) because Synanon committed fraud upon the
court.146
As is evident from this discussion, even the clearest portion of the fundamental
public policy requirement—the illegality aspect—would benefit from significant
clarification. The IRS claims authority to reject or revoke the tax-exempt status of
any organization that violates the law. 147 It is, however, far from clear that the IRS
should treat illegality as a bright-line disqualification. Illegality is not the equivalent
of immorality.

134. Id. at 1059.
135. Id. at 1065.
136. James E. Bristol, III, Free Expression in Motion Pictures: Childhood Sexuality and a
Satisfied Society, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 333, 342 (2007).
137. Id. at 345–46.
138. Mysteryboy, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1068–69 .
139. 579 F. Supp. 967, 969 (D.D.C. 1984).
140. Id. at 970.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 971.
143. Id. at 971, 977.
144. Id. at 978–79.
145. Id. at 979.
146. Id. at 972.
147. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
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The problematic approach currently taken by the IRS is that there is a long history
in the United States of civil disobedience as a morally justified “conscientious
violation of the law as a protest over an unjust law or governmental policy.”148
Abolitionists deliberately flouted the law in opposing slavery. 149 Toward the end of
his life, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. called for civil disobedience to call attention to
the evils of racism, poverty, and unemployment.150
We do not know, however, how the public policy doctrine would have applied to
abolitionists; the abolition movement occurred prior to the federal income tax, and
therefore prior to the existence of tax-exempt organizations. And the civil rights
movement’s civil disobedience is similarly inapposite, both because the disobedience
was generally performed by individuals, not tax-exempt organizations, and because
it occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s adoption of the fundamental public policy
standard.
Even today, though, civil disobedience occurs. And sometimes tax-exempt
organizations participate. Recently, in response to the Obama administration’s deportations of undocumented Central American immigrants, dozens of churches have
revived the sanctuary movement.151 In violation of federal law, these churches
(which are exempt from taxation) provide a refuge for immigrants facing
deportation.152
In the past, organizations that encouraged civil disobedience (even if they
themselves did not participate in it) have had their applications for tax exemption
rejected by the IRS on public policy and illegality grounds. 153 Illegality in the service
of civil disobedience is substantively different, though, than illegality in the pursuit
of selfish ends. Where the latter certainly violates public policy, it is not clear that
the former does. Public policy may favor civil disobedience, notwithstanding that it
necessarily involves violating the law.154 In fact, Dr. King asserted that, just as people
have a moral obligation to obey just laws, they have “a moral responsibility to
disobey unjust laws.”155 And that moral obligation complicates the question of

148. Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil Disobedience and
the Rule of Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2083, 2085 (2007).
149. Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 71 (1990).
150. Id. at 76.
151. Cathaleen Chen, How Churches Are Protecting Immigrants from Deportation,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0208
/How-churches-are-protecting-immigrants-from-deportation [https://perma.cc/D5D3-HFUR].
152. Cindy Carcamo, After Recent ICE Raids, Sanctuary Movement Grows for Immigrants
Here Illegally, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016, 7:20 A.M.), http://www.latimes.com/local/california
/la-me-immigration-sanctuary-revival-20160208-story.html [https://perma.cc/R3UB-DSBT].
153. Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204.
154. Although Henry David Thoreau recognized that there were unjust laws, he was not
content to obey them, or even obey them until they could be changed through legal means.
Rather, he said, “[i]f the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go . . . . Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine.” HENRY D. THOREAU,
Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, AND OTHER WRITINGS 227, 234
(William Rossi ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 3d ed. 2008) (1849).
155. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT
85, 93 (1963).
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whether illegality is an appropriate bright-line rule for determining fundamental
public policy.
Courts’ hesitation to apply the fundamental public policy rule is understandable.
The Supreme Court emphasized that it should only be applied “only where there is
no doubt that the organization’s activities violate fundamental public policy.”156 But
courts’ understandable skittishness at applying the rule means they have done
nothing to clarify the muddy waters in which the IRS currently operates. It also
means that neither the IRS nor the courts have provided tax-exempt organizations
with any guidance as to what “fundamental public policy” means outside of the
context of racial discrimination in education.
C. But the IRS Does Not Have To Enforce the Fundamental Public Policy Rule
Bob Jones does not mandate that the IRS revoke the tax exemptions of entities
that violate a fundamental public policy. In fact, outside of the context of racially
discriminatory schools, the IRS has rarely (if ever) revoked an exemption for violation of public policy and has only denied exemptions on public policy grounds in
rare instances, as discussed above.157 The rare instances where the IRS has revoked
or denied exemptions on public policy grounds certainly do not represent a complete
list of behaviors that violate public policy.158 And yet the IRS has not revoked the
tax exemptions of organizations that violate other fundamental public policies. How
can that be?
There are a handful of reasons that the IRS can ignore tax-exempt organizations’
bad behavior. The first is, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones did not mandate the loss of exemption. Rather, it confirmed that revocations for the violation of
fundamental public policies was constitutionally permissible. Though the IRS can
revoke exemptions, the Supreme Court did not create a constitutional obligation for
it to do so, and Congress has never explicitly required the IRS to enforce the public
policy rule either.
This lack of constitutional or statutory obligation matters. It buttresses the fact
that, both as a legal and a practical matter, the IRS has complete discretion to not
enforce the fundamental public policy rule. How does the IRS have such unconstrained discretion when it comes to not enforcing the public policy rule?
1. Administrative Discretion
In the first instance, the IRS enjoys broad administrative discretion when it comes
to choosing not to enforce rules.159 When the Supreme Court recognized the right of
the executive branch to refuse to enforce laws, it grounded that right in three main
considerations.160 It allowed an agency to balance factors, including whether

156. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983).
157. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
159. Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time To Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition.
Even Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 163–64 (2016); David J. Herzig, Justice for
All: Reimagining the Internal Revenue Service, 33 VA. TAX REV. 1, 16–17 (2013).
160. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985).
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enforcement is a good use of finite agency resources. 161 It recognized that refusing
to act does not exercise coercive power.162 And it acknowledged that an agency’s
refusal to act was closely related to the decision not to indict, a decision that had long
been granted to the executive branch.163
Even those proponents of same-sex marriage who want religions that oppose it to
lose their exemptions are powerless to effect that change. Only the IRS can revoke
an organization’s tax-exempt status.164 As a federal administrative agency, the IRS
is part of the executive branch and, as part of the government, its decisions are subject
to judicial review.165 As a result, proponents of same-sex marriage could in theory
lobby the president to appoint an IRS commissioner who would prioritize revoking
religions’ exemptions, or they could attempt to litigate. Neither move would be
effective, though.
The executive has a long history of using the IRS to do its bidding. From President
John F. Kennedy in the 1960s, to the Nixon Enemies List in the 1970s, to alleged
misconduct in the 1990s, politicians are happy to use the IRS to do their dirty work. 166
To ensure that politics did not affect the IRS’s audit decisions, in 1998 Congress
passed the Restructuring and Reform Act. 167 The Act established a taxpayer bill of
rights that was intended to protect taxpayers from IRS abuses.168 Although there have
been some anomalies, such as the recent Tea Party scandal, in general the IRS has
demonstrated its independence from the executive.169
Finally, the doctrine of administrative discretion—a derivative of prosecutorial
discretion—gives the IRS “leeway to decline to enforce statutes and shields [its]
inaction from judicial review.”170 In general, unless Congress has explicitly required
the IRS to enforce a particular part of the tax law, courts will respect the IRS’s
decision not to enforce it.171 Even if opposing same-sex marriage violated an established public policy, Congress has not mandated that the IRS enforce the public

161. Id. at 831.
162. Id. at 832.
163. Id.
164. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(n)(6)(i) (as amended in 2002).
165. In theory, Congress could also pass legislation requiring the IRS to revoke churches’
exemptions. Even if a majority of Congress supported such a move, though, congressional
gridlock would make its enactment difficult. See Michael Doran, Tax Legislation in the
Contemporary U.S. Congress, 67 TAX L. REV. 555, 557 (2014).
166. Herzig, supra note 159, at 21–22.
167. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998).
168. Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971, 981
(2003).
169. There are other areas that have come up, including the Service reliance on the
Department of Justice to enforce the litigation position of the Service in district courts, the
courts of appeals, or the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Herzig, supra note 159, at 40–47.
170. Brunson, supra note 159, at 163–64.
171. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834–35 (1985). The Supreme Court held open the
possibility that in some cases, agency refusal to enforce a provision could be so extreme that
it warranted judicial oversight, id. at 833 n.4, but no case has ever found such abdication,
Brunson, supra note 159, at 164–65.
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policy doctrine. As such, the IRS’s decision not to revoke a church’s tax exemption
is insulated from judicial review by three layers of laws.
Even if the IRS internally decided to revoke a religion’s exemption, it would face
serious practical impediments. The tax law mandates that the IRS follow a
complicated, burdensome set of procedures both to initiate and to perform a church
audit.172 In light of the fallout of its delay in processing certain Tea Party groups’
exemption applications, the IRS is understandably gun-shy about acting in a way that
could be seen as targeting conservative tax-exempt organizations on the basis of their
beliefs.173 Even if the government were to tax churches, more than ninety percent of
most churches’ revenue comes from member contributions, which do not constitute
taxable income.174 The IRS would balance the criticism it could expect against the
little, if any, additional revenue it would collect for the federal government. 175
The IRS does not enjoy unlimited administrative discretion, of course. Congress
has the ability to expressly require the IRS to enforce the law, thus overruling its
discretion.176 Although Congress apparently approves of the public policy rule, 177 it
has never explicitly required the IRS to enforce it.
The Supreme Court also suggested that a court could adjudicate questions of
agency nonenforcement where agency inaction amounts to “an abdication of its
statutory responsibilities.”178 The Supreme Court did not define the contours of
abdication, though, and has never revisited the question.179 Lower courts, which have
adjudicated questions of abdication, have universally found that the agency in
question did not abdicate its statutory responsibilities and thus did not compromise
its administrative discretion.180 Thus, judicial doctrine shields the IRS from taxpayer
pressure to revoke discriminatory schools’ exemptions.181

172. See Brunson, supra note 159, at 168–69.
173. Id. at 193–94.
174. GIVING USA FOUND., GIVING USA 2014: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY
FOR THE YEAR 2013, at 106 (2014).
175. Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty To Enforce
the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 153 (2011).
176. Brunson, supra note 159, at 164.
177. One of the reasons the Supreme Court gave for upholding the IRS’s fundamental public policy requirement was that Congress had been aware of the IRS’s requirement, had
actually introduced thirteen bills to overturn it, and had failed to pass a single one. Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600–01 (1983). While congressional inaction does not
always demonstrate Congressional acquiescence, the Court acknowledged, in this case, Congress appeared to acquiesce. Id. at 600.
178. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).
179. Brunson, supra note 159, at 164–65.
180. Id. at 165.
181. For example, the Southern Poverty Law Center classifies Westboro Baptist Church as
a hate group. The Church has many discriminatory factors. Yet the tax exemption of the
organization has yet to be threatened by the IRS. See, e.g., Corey Brettschneider, Democratic
Persuasion and Freedom of Speech: A Response to Four Critics and Two Allies, 79 BROOK.
L. REV. 1059, 1071 (2014); J. Bryan Lowder, Subsidized Hate: Why the Westboro Bapitst
Church Remains Tax-Exempt, SLATE (Mar. 4, 2011, 5:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles
/news_and_politics/explainer/2011/03/subsidized_hate.html [https://perma.cc/P6WG-CGE4].
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Ultimately, the IRS’s insulation from taxpayer pressure means that even when we
know that protecting LGBT individuals from discrimination is a fundamental public
policy, the IRS must affirmatively decide to revoke discriminatory schools’
exemptions. But, in spite of more than a decade of concerted federal effort to eliminate racial discrimination in education, the IRS initially decided that it could not and
would not do so.182 Ultimately, it took a lawsuit to motivate the IRS’s actions, actions
which were eventually confirmed by the Supreme Court.
2. Standing
Likewise, courts cannot force the IRS to revoke a religious institution’s tax
exemption. No matter how sincerely or vocally a taxpayer may want to see it done,
an IRS decision not to revoke is immune from judicial review. 183 The IRS derives its
immunity from judicial oversight from three main requirements.
First is the constitutional requirement that a litigant have suffered an injury in fact
before a court has jurisdiction to hear a controversy. 184 Taxpayers suffer no injury in
fact when the IRS grants a tax exemption to a third party. 185 And while the Supreme
Court allows litigants to avoid the injury-in-fact requirement through a doctrine
called “Establishment Clause standing,” the circumstances permitting Establishment
Clause standing are tremendously narrow. 186 Among other things, a litigant must
show a government expenditure of money, and under the Court’s current literalistic
view of Establishment Clause standing, an exemption from tax is not the same thing
as direct government spending.187
Standing represented the fundamental bar to taxpayers’ forcing the IRS to act
here. Taxpayers—including LGBT students—lack standing to sue the IRS for its
nonenforcement. Standing requires, among other things, a litigant who could assert
that she had suffered an injury in fact that is traceable to the IRS’s nonenforcement.188
A school’s discrimination against LGBT students certainly harms those students, but
that harm is insufficient to grant LGBT students standing to challenge the IRS’s
nonenforcement of the public policy rule. In the first instance, the injury is traceable
to the actions of the discriminatory school, not to the IRS’s nonenforcement of the
public policy rule. A school’s exempt status does not cause it to discriminate; while
it perhaps subsidizes the discrimination, an injury in fact must be a concrete injury,
not one that is conjectural or hypothetical. 189

182. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
183. See Brunson, supra note 159, at 161.
184. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
185. Brunson, supra note 159, at 161.
186. Linda Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court Has Reduced
Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 800 (2013).
187. Id.
188. Brunson, supra note 159, at 161.
189. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The impotence of taxpayers in the face of IRS inaction does
not mean, of course, that taxpayers cannot challenge certain IRS actions. A taxpayer only has
standing, though, when IRS acts in a way that directly impacts her. See Gregg D. Polsky, Can
Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 239 (2004). In a nonenforcement
situation, though, no taxpayer suffers tangible harm, and the indirect and diffuse harm of
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How did Mississippi parents’ lawsuit get past the standing bar? The court
essentially eluded the question; though the Treasury Department, in its role as defendant, contended that the plaintiffs had no standing, the court in Green v. Kennedy
decided that it did not need to consider the question. 190 Still, the court asserted that
the plaintiffs had “standing to attack the constitutionality of statutory provisions
which they claim provides an unconstitutional system of benefits and matching
grants” that supported discriminatory schools.191 It referred to Coffey v. State
Educational Finance Commission,192 another district court case, as precedent for its
view on standing.193
In that case, a class of African American parents in Mississippi challenged the
state’s provision of tuition grants to children who lived in school districts that had
desegregated.194 Though the court in that case did not analyze standing, it appears to
have assumed plaintiffs had standing. It determined that the tuition grants perpetuated segregation and enjoined the state from providing the grants. 195
There is a substantive difference between Green and Coffey, though: in Coffey,
the state actually expended money, while in Green, the challenged subsidy was
merely a tax benefit. Economically, of course, the two are identical—there is no
substantive difference between the state giving parents $1000, which they will then
pay to a school, and the state reducing the school’s taxes by $1000. Either way, the
school has an additional $1000 that it can use.
But economics notwithstanding, the courts view the two as different, at least as a
basis for standing. In 1968, the Supreme Court created “taxpayer standing,” a small
exception to the strict “injury in fact” standing requirement.196 Under certain circumstances, taxpayer standing allows taxpayers to challenge tax laws as unconstitutional,
even if they are not directly harmed by the law in question. 197 However, taxpayer
standing has generally been limited to questions of religious establishment, and,
more importantly, requires both taxing and spending.198 That is, a mere tax subsidy
is insufficient to overcome the personalized injury standing requirement. 199
Moreover, the fact that the Green court found standing has no ongoing legal
significance. A district court opinion not only does not provide binding precedent for
courts outside of its jurisdiction, it also does not bind its own district, or even the

having to pay marginally more in taxes to make up for the taxes unpaid by a wrongfully exempt
organization are insufficient to create standing. See Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the
Watchers: Preventing I.R.S. Abuse of the Tax System, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 223, 244 (2013).
190. 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (D.D.C. 1970).
191. Id.
192. 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
193. Green, 309 F. Supp. at 1132.
194. Coffey, 296 F. Supp. at 1390–91.
195. Id. at 1392.
196. See Brunson, supra note 159, at 162.
197. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
198. Brunson, supra note 159, at 163.
199. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 142 (2011) (“When the
government declines to impose a tax, by contrast, . . . [a]ny financial injury remains
speculative.”).
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judge herself in future cases.200 The fact that once taxpayers were able to judicially
force the IRS to revoke discriminatory schools’ tax exemptions is merely an accident
of history, then. But it does nothing to support the idea that taxpayers currently have
that ability. In fact, in a subsequent suit by African American parents claiming that
the IRS was not doing a good enough job at denying tax exemptions to discriminatory
private schools, the Supreme Court found that, notwithstanding Green, the plaintiff
parents had no standing to bring the suit. 201
Of course, there is one significant difference between 1970, when the Court
created taxpayer standing, and today: in 1970, the IRS had decided it did not have
authority to revoke a private school’s tax exemption unless the school had sufficient
connections with the government. Today, the Supreme Court has made clear that
revoking a private school’s tax exemption for violating a fundamental public policy
is constitutionally permissible. Still, knowing that it can act and actually deciding to
act are two fundamentally different things. That is, even knowing it has the ability to
revoke a private school’s exemption does not provide an incentive for the IRS to do
so.
Second, even if taxpayers had standing, courts generally cannot provide the kind
of relief that would be necessary to force the IRS to act. The Declaratory Judgments
Act, which generally allows courts to “declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party,” explicitly carves out taxes from courts’ declaratory judgment
authority.202 Mirroring the limitations in the Declaratory Judgments Act, the Tax
Anti-Injunction Act prevents suits seeking to enjoin the assessment or collection of
taxes.203 Even if taxpayers had Establishment Clause standing, then, these laws
would insulate the IRS from outside pressure to revoke churches’ exemptions.204
III. FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
Based on the existing rules as established and as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, the practical constraints, and additional constitutional impediments, it is unlikely that the IRS would have to navigate that a revocation of a religious organization’s exemption for discriminating against LGBT individuals would occur. These
constitutional hurdles are not insurmountable, of course. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that religiously affiliated organizations can lose their tax exemptions,
and lower courts have allowed the IRS to revoke churches’ exemptions, albeit less

200. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district
court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial
district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.” (quoting 18 J. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02[1][d] (3d ed. 2011)). That is not to say, of course, that
a district court opinion has no precedential value; to the extent its reasoning is persuasive, it
can certainly influence future courts. See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16
NEV. L.J. 515, 519–20 (2016). Where its reasoning is absent or unpersuasive, or where other
courts have since taken the law in a different direction, though, a district court opinion cannot
be used to reverse the direction of the law.
201. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739–40 (1984).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
203. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
204. See Brunson, supra note 159.
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frequently.205 Still, there are constitutional limits: in general, the government cannot
impose its will on church ecclesiastical decisions, either directly or indirectly. 206
While the government can impose conditions on benefits it grants, it cannot “grant a
benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if
the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”207
In this Part we will utilize the existing pragmatic frame as we examine whether
Obergefell facially changes the analysis. Here we rely on the historic context of the
evolution of the fundamental public policy doctrine as well as the limited application.
We think it is useful to compare side by side the rationales for retention in the context
of religion and religiously based educational institutions. In the next Part, we will
change the frame by discussing possible outcomes and limitations should a more
expansive view of the doctrine take hold.
A. Religiously Affiliated Organizations and Fundamental Public Policy
The question of whether religiously affiliated organizations can lose their tax
exemptions for violating a fundamental public policy is, ultimately, an easy question
based on the existing rules but a potentially harder question based on religious liberty
concerns. Almost instantly after the IRS introduced the fundamental public policy
requirement, the question arose whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment circumscribed the IRS’s ability to revoke the tax exemption of a religiously affiliated discriminatory private school.208 The Supreme Court, in Bob Jones,
adopted the IRS’s view that violation of a fundamental public policy (here,
antidiscrimination in education) was incompatible with tax exemption. 209 It went on
to hold that the government’s interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education was sufficiently compelling that it outweighed the burden on religious practice
the schools faced in losing their exemptions. 210 As long as a right rose to the level of
a fundamental public policy, then the balance of the scales would tip to protecting
that right over the religious liberty of the school.
Using the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bob Jones, it is clear that there is
theoretically no constitutional impediment to revoking a religious university’s tax
exemption if that university discriminates against LGBT students and such discrimination violates a fundamental public policy. The Supreme Court explicitly

205. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’g 40
F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 1999); Alan L. Feld, Rendering unto Caesar or Electioneering for
Caesar? Loss of Church Tax Exemption for Participation in Electoral Politics, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 931, 933 (2001) (“The appellate court held that revocation of the exemption did not place
a substantial burden on Branch Ministries’ exercise of religion.”). But see George Regas, The
Won’t-Be-Bullied Pulpit, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov
/09/opinion/oe-regas9 [https://perma.cc/8ZQH-WD47] (discussing retention of tax exemption
after IRS investigation for political speech).
206. IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 73 (2014).
207. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
208. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 582 (1983).
209. Id. at 595 (“There can thus be no question that the interpretation of § 170 and
§ 501(c)(3) announced by the IRS in 1970 was correct.”).
210. Id. at 604.
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blessed the IRS’s ability to revoke even a religious organization’s tax-exempt status
for such violation.211 Moreover, even if a school has a sincere religious mandate to
oppose homosexuality, as long as the government’s interest in eliminating such
discrimination was sufficiently compelling, the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment may not protect the tax exemption.
Cedarville University then takes the position that “[w]e believe that God’s design
at Creation for sexual desire and orientation is within the bounds of a marriage union
between a man and a woman.”212 If the IRS and ultimately the Supreme Court believe
that same-sex marriage is a fundamental public policy, then the tax exemption of
Cedarville University could be revoked. Essentially, this is Bob Jones in same-sex
marriage. The Supreme Court recognized that, while paying taxes imposes a burden,
the burden of taxpaying does not necessarily prevent the exercise of religion. 213
B. Churches and Fundamental Public Policy
In some ways, churches present an easier question: it seems largely
uncontroversial that, even if religiously affiliated tax-exempt organizations should
lose their tax exemptions for violating fundamental public policies, churches should
not. Among the rights it enshrines in the Constitution, the First Amendment provides
expressly for the free exercise of religion. 214 If free exercise means anything, one
could argue, it must mean that churches enjoy an extra level of protection from state
infringement.215
The idea that the Free Exercise Clause provides additional rights to corporate
churches, as opposed to the body of believers, turns out to be controversial, though.
Some scholars argue that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment grants
broad autonomy for churches, subject to being overridden “only for grave reasons of
state.”216 Other scholars, uncomfortable with church autonomy, argue that the Free
Exercise Clause “applies exclusively to individuals,” not to churches.217 Still others
fall somewhere between these two extreme positions: while the religion clauses do
apply to churches, they say, churches do not have unlimited autonomy from the
state.218
Adjudicating between these various views of how the religion clauses apply to

211. Id. at 605.
212. THE CEDARVILLE EXPERIENCE, supra note 79, at 12.
213. See generally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial
Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1180 (2009); Mirkay, supra
note 111; Susannah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profit/Nonprofit Border, 118
PENN ST. L. REV. 489, 500 (2014).
214. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
215. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy
and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1291–92 (1980)
(“[I]nquiry into the permissible forms and limits of judicial intervention when the matters in
controversy relate to disagreements over religious doctrine and practice embraces more fundamental issues concerning the protections afforded by the first amendment.”).
216. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 206, at 43–44.
217. Id. at 44.
218. Id.
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churches is beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, it is generally unimportant
in answering whether the fundamental public policy rule can apply to churches.
Scholars who understand the First Amendment as providing for church autonomy
would clearly argue that church exemptions should not rest on following fundamental public policy.219
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence sides with these scholars, recognizing that
churches have specific rights beyond the merely associational enjoyed by both religious and secular groups.220 The idea that churches merely have the same associational rights as any other organization is, according to the Supreme Court, “hard to
square with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to
the rights of religious organizations.”221
If the Supreme Court were to revisit its view, though, and find no institutional
rights granted by the religion clauses of the First Amendment, the fundamental public
policy rule would still be unlikely to apply to church tax exemptions. Even scholars
who are profoundly skeptical of church autonomy arguments would seem to agree
that churches have the ability to define their own doctrine and beliefs. 222 They merely
come to that conclusion differently than scholars who argue for church autonomy.
Congress has also infused the tax law with some level of church autonomy.
Although churches’ tax exemptions begin in the same Code section as the exemptions of other public charities, the Code includes several provisions that exempt
churches from requirements applicable to those other public charities. For example,
most charitable organizations must apply to the IRS for tax-exempt status.223
Churches, though, are exempt from the application requirement, gaining their tax
exemption automatically by virtue of being churches. 224
The differences do not end at formation, moreover. Even after a church
(automatically) becomes exempt, the tax law continues to treat it differently in certain significant respects. Most tax-exempt organizations must file an annual information return with the IRS detailing certain financial information.225 For most
organizations, moreover, tax exemption comes with a significant loss of privacy:
they are required to make their exemption applications and their annual returns
available, not just to the IRS, but to the public at large.226

219. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
253, 254 (2009) (“[W]hen a church does something by way of managing its own internal affairs, it does not have to point to a doctrine or a prohibition or a claim of conscience in every
case. It can make out a good church autonomy claim simply by saying that this is internal to
the church.”).
220. Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012).
221. Id.
222. Cf. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99
VA. L. REV. 917, 975 (2013) (“The ministerial exception fits quite comfortably within the
Lockean justification for church self-governance and is fully explainable as a defense of the
freedom of conscience for individuals within the church.”).
223. I.R.C. § 508(a) (2012).
224. Id. § 508(c)(1)(A). The only other kind of tax-exempt organization that is statutorily
exempt from the application requirement is a public charity that expects annual gross receipts
of $5000 or less. Id. § 508(c)(1)(B).
225. Id. § 6033(a)(1).
226. Id. § 6104(a), (c).
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Just as the tax law does not require churches to apply for exemption, it does not
require them to file annual information returns. 227 Because churches need neither file
exemption applications nor annual information returns, they also need not provide
financial disclosure to the public at large.
And this exemption provided to churches was not a mere accident of history: in
1969, the House of Representatives proposed legislation that would have required
churches to file information returns. 228 The risk galvanized churches, which lobbied
the Senate, and ultimately preserved their exemption from the generally applicable
filing requirement.229
In addition to churches’ exemption from the application and filing requirements
generally applicable to tax-exempt organizations, the Code also provides churches
special procedural protections. To the extent the IRS wants to audit a church, it must
jump through additional more stringent restrictions on those audits, including
additional notice requirements, limits on the scope of what an audit can investigate,
and limits on the length and frequency of audits. 230
The IRS appears to have largely internalized the legislative and judicial deference
given churches. As we have discussed above, the IRS has, by and large, not invoked
the public policy requirement to reject or revoke organizations’ exemptions.231 Even
in the area of racial discrimination, where it has the strongest explicit mandate and
has, in fact, revoked exemptions, it has not revoked the exemption of a single
discriminatory church.
Whether or not the Constitution guarantees church autonomy, then, the practical
effect of the religion clauses, combined with judicial interpretation, legislative
mandates, and administrative buy-in, suggests that churches need not worry about
losing their exemptions for violating fundamental public policy. The government
does not interfere in internal governance of religious bodies, and such bodies are
therefore protected from state-level repercussions (such as losing their tax
exemptions) in a way that religiously affiliated schools and other charitable
institutions are not.
IV. EXPANSIVE FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY
As evident from the prior discussion, the well-accepted axiom that the IRS should
be nothing more than a neutral collector of taxation does not reflect the actual
position of the IRS.232 This idealistic position has been shown to be vulnerable when,
for instance, the IRS has been influenced by the political whims of Congress or the
President.233 Every time that the IRS has stepped outside the bounds of its identity as
a theoretic neutral arbitrator of determining taxable income, however, there has been

227. Id. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i).
228. Samuel D. Brunson, The Present, Past, and Future of LDS Financial Transparency,
48 DIALOGUE 1, 5 (2015).
229. Id. at 5–7.
230. I.R.C. § 7611 (2012).
231. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
232. Herzig, supra note 159, at 1.
233. Herzig, supra note 159, at 25–27.
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an immediate reigning in of the agency. 234 As a general rule, the IRS should not
function as a policymaker but rather as an enforcer and administrator of the policy
decisions of Congress.
Yet despite that clear line of historic treatment, in Bob Jones, the Court
acknowledged that the IRS could play a policy role, at least in overlay of the public
policy requirement to tax-exempt organizations.235 Even at the time, this policy role
was controversial, though: in his concurrence, Justice Powell suggested that allocating this responsibility to the IRS was improper.236 Congress legislated specific
qualification criteria for tax-exempt organizations, including churches and educational institutions. Congress did not provide for an overarching exception to the
aforementioned charitable rules based on the IRS’s importing of value judgments to
the analysis. If the IRS, post-Obergefell, follows the lead advocated by Professors
Tribe and Yoshino and applies the fundamental public policy requirement diachronically, then Congress or Treasury needs to implement objective criteria to determine when a policy transitions into a fundamental public policy.
Applying the fundamental public policy doctrine in a post-Obergefell paradigm
will prove problematic without a framework for determining the boundaries of what
constitutes a fundamental public policy. Line-drawing exercises can be complicated
to perform in a principled way. 237 With no guidance beyond the vagaries that
currently define fundamental public policies, judges will be forced to interject their
own moral judgment in the process. And a judge’s own moral judgment is ultimately
arbitrary and unpredictable: would-be tax-exempt organizations have no way of
knowing ex ante what a judge will see as violating fundamental public policy. The
rule, then, will necessarily punish bad actors, rather than discouraging tax-exempt
organizations from acting badly. Compliance with this kind of inchoate rule borders
on the impossible.
Without a bright-line test, the aforementioned vague rule making is compounded
in two distinct but related areas. First, the agency continues to be subject to capture
by Congress and the executive.238 The IRS has recently faced significant backlash
for allegedly inserting its value judgment into the granting of exemption for conservative social welfare organizations.239 The subsequent scandal involving
Commissioner Lois Lerner clearly signals that congressional intent and public
opinion do not allow for the IRS to interject policy judgments. 240

234. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 606–07 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
237. Cf. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 810–11 (2006) (demonstrating that line
drawing exercises in any context are difficult by focusing on attempts to draw lines of years
alone in examining Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding strict scrutiny).
238. Herzig, supra note 159, at 22–23.
239. Stephen Dinan, Tea Party Targeting Accusations, Legal Issues Persist for IRS After
Justice Ends Probe, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com
/news/2015/oct/25/irs-tea-party-targeting-accusations-legal-issues-p/?page=all [https://perma
.cc/3UUF-FTKC].
240. Jackie Calmes, Senate Report Cites I.R.S. Mismanagement in Targeting Tea Party
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Additionally, not only could the IRS improperly attempt to regulate various
charities, but entities cannot comply with an ethereal rule. The goal of the tax code
is to encourage compliance through a clear allocation of responsibility and rules. 241
If there is no clear definition of the fundamental public policy, how can an entity
comply with the rule? And where the exempt entity cannot understand what the
fundamental public policy is—or even where figuring it out is too costly—the rule
cannot do its work. If there is a fundamental public policy rule, the rule should be to
encourage the school to not be discriminatory rather than punish a school after the
fact.
What are the contours of the rule the Supreme Court created in Bob Jones? No
one really knows. That is why during oral arguments in Obergefell, Justice Alito
wondered about the applicability of the fundamental public policy rule to same-sex
marriage.242 This is because in Bob Jones, outside of illegality and discrimination,
the Supreme Court created a vague standard that is not eligible for consistent application by the IRS, other courts, or taxpayers.
It is because of the vagueness of the future application of the fundamental public
policy rule many argue that the result of Bob Jones is an outlier.243 As we discussed,
one can count on one hand the number of charities that have had their charitable
exemption revoked because they violated the public policy rule for anything other
than racial discrimination.244 “[O]nly organizations that participated in racial discrimination, advocated civil disobedience, or were involved in an illegal activity
have lost their tax-exempt status pursuant to the public-policy doctrine.”245 If Bob
Jones is an anomaly, charities should not be concerned with violating the public
policy doctrine. However, we are not entirely sure that the holding of Bob Jones
applies only to racially discriminatory schools.
Rather, we argue that the marginalization of Bob Jones relates to a failure to be
able to extrapolate when the doctrine would likely apply. While we believe that the
fundamental public policy requirement reflects a real and valuable normative
framework, we also believe that in its current vague state, it does not accomplish its

Groups, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/us/politics/senate
-report-cites-irs-mismanagement-in-targeting-of-tea-party-groups.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc
/2QJY-SEWN].
241. Brunson, supra note 189, at 224–25; David J. Herzig, Something from Nothing: Taxing Assets Accurately, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1109; Leandra Lederman, The Interplay
Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003);
Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice To Target Tax Enforcement,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 695 (2009).
242. See supra notes 113–23 and accompanying text.
243. David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption—Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 53–54 (2006);
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ.
L. REV. 977, 1012 (2010).
244. See supra notes 113–23 and accompanying text.
245. Nicholas A. Mirkay, Losing Our Religion: Reevaluating the Section 501(c)(3) Exemption of Religious Organizations that Discriminate, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 715, 738
(2009).
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purpose.246 The requirement should not focus on punishing organizations that violate
fundamental public policies. Rather, it should be designed in a manner that gives
charities ex ante guidance, encouraging them to act in socially beneficial ways.
The law has a simple way it could provide this ex ante guidance. Congress, the
Treasury Department, or the courts could develop a framework to give tax-exempt
organizations the necessary and appropriate guidance. 247 In areas of the tax law similar to this, safe harbors function to facilitate the orderly administration of the tax
laws.248 Alternatively, Congress should act in defining the rule. We believe that taxpayers should have clear guidance on whether they are in compliance with the laws.
We propose three potential frameworks for determining whether a tax-exempt
organization violates public policy when it discriminates against a group of people.
For our purposes, we have limited these options to dealing with tax-exempt organizations’ discriminatory policies, primarily because discrimination was the focus of
Bob Jones and is the focus of current battles over the application of the public policy
rule. Certainly, nothing in our proposal would prevent the IRS from denying taxexempt status to entities that break the law or violate some nondiscriminatory public
policy. Neither category of denial, however, has historically been common or
fraught.249 If the nondiscrimination portions of the public policy requirement were to
become more prominent, it may be worth returning to address them systemically. In
the meantime, though, we see value in providing a heuristic for determining whether
certain behaviors violate the public policy rule.
Two of the frameworks we propose function as bright-line rules—albeit moveable
bright-line rules—explaining specifically how to determine whether a tax-exempt’s
discrimination does not trigger the safe harbor rule. The third would provide a safe
harbor (or, more specifically, a “sure shipwreck”)250 for certain types of
discrimination.
In addition to cascading from least to most impactful, our proposed heuristic
cascades from least to most fluid. The narrowest application would find a violation
of the fundamental public policy doctrine in situations where the Supreme Court uses

246. In fact, while it is beyond the scope of this Article, the vagueness of the contours of
the public policy requirement may have constitutional implications: a law may be “void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108 (1972).
247. See generally Emily Cauble, Safe Harbors in Tax Law, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1385, 1387
(2015) (“Safe harbors represent one example of a type of tax provision in between the extreme
ends of the rule-standard spectrum, with some rule-like characteristics and some standard-like
characteristics. If a taxpayer meets the typically clear requirements of a given safe harbor, the
law assures the taxpayer of receiving specific, generally favorable tax treatment.” (footnotes
omitted)); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
560 (1992) (discussing the differences between standards and rules); Susan C. Morse, Safe
Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385, 1389 (2016) (discussing how safe
harbors cause more problems than rules or standards).
248. Morse, supra note 247, at 1389.
249. See supra notes 113–23 and accompanying text.
250. Professor Morse describes a “sure shipwreck” as a combination of a rule and a standard that “describes conduct that will definitely violate the law, while other facts remain subject
to a standard as applied by the ex post judgment of future decision makers.” Morse, supra note
247, at 1387–88.
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the strict scrutiny analysis. The intermediate application would use the Civil Rights
Act as the proxy for fundamental public policy. Finally, the broadest application
would be utilizing the equal protection test under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although it is administratively complicated, the IRS already applies a fifteen-part
test to determine whether an entity is a church, so it could certainly apply the equal
protection test here.251
Each of these potential frameworks lines up with one branch of government: the
courts determine which classifications will trigger strict scrutiny, Congress chooses
which classifications will be protected by the Civil Rights Act, and the Treasury
Department could create a blacklist of behaviors that violate the equal protection test.
In determining the benefits and burdens of each potential safe harbor, policy makers
could simultaneously determine which branch of government they believe is best
suited to provide this guidance to tax-exempt organizations.
A. Strict Scrutiny
Over time, in the realm of constitutional review, the Supreme Court has
established a taxonomy of three tiers of review: (i) strict scrutiny, (ii) intermediate
scrutiny, and (iii) rational basis review. 252 By using these three tiers, the Court has
set the boundaries that create predictability in the majority of cases. “By establishing
stable and predictable definitions of litigants’ burdens of persuasion and production,
judicial employment of tiers of scrutiny lowers decision costs and expedites
litigation.”253
Although many academics have engaged in a push to eliminate the levels of
scrutiny,254 the idea of strict scrutiny has a long and developed history. For our purposes, the viability or the authenticity of the standard is not important. Rather, we
believe the tax law could import the strict scrutiny standard to determine whether
discrimination violates a fundamental public policy because of the doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings as well as the rigor in which courts apply it.
To determine whether strict scrutiny applies, the Court applies a “test [that]
governs challenges under the Equal Protection Clause to statutes that discriminate on
the basis of race or other ‘suspect’ classifications.”255 In strict scrutiny a statute that
restricts a fundamental right can only survive if it advances compelling government

251. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 1828, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS 33 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX2V
-9CHW] (listing the fifteen factors); see also Mirkay, supra note 245, at 764 (arguing that the
IRS should confine the use of the fifteen–point test to only churches).
252. See Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 575, 577 (2013).
253. Id.
254. For example, Professor Gerhardt has proposed a sophisticated theory of judicial review that asks the Supreme Court in effect to allow Congress to be Congress. Michael J.
Gerhardt, Letting Congress Be Congress: A Comment on Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated
Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 291 (2013).
255. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268–69
(2007).
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interests.256 The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny analysis narrowly, from
First Amendment laws that regulate speech to racial discrimination. 257
Strict scrutiny is particularly apt for our purposes because, like fundamental
public policy, it is diachronic. The strict scrutiny standard was first articulated in
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.258 In Carolene Products, the
Supreme Court reversed the Lochner-era Supreme Court by upholding economic
regulations as “long as the law is a ‘rational’ way of furthering any ‘legitimate’
governmental purpose.”259 Carolene Products did not set a strict-scrutiny standard
in stone, though. Rather, it left open the door for more robust scrutiny in the cases of
fundamental rights and discrimination against racial minorities.
In 1942, the Supreme Court used the heightened standard in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
where Justice Douglas wrote “strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes
in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the
constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.”260 What began as a limited constitutional doctrine affecting economic regulations with only an eye on future
applications took hold as judicial doctrine.
The evolution of the doctrine continued over time to include free speech and equal
protection261 and then to racial classifications. 262 The evolution of the doctrine over
time allowed the Supreme Court to create a malleable taxonomy of classifications
with a prescribed doctrine for examination. For example, in the 1950s, the Warren
Court expanded the doctrine to religion as well as to voting and travel.263 From our
perspective, the fact that as society evolved strict scrutiny also evolved from the first
limited use related to economic regulation to a more robust protection of certain
groups indicates the viability of the doctrine for use in determining whether a policy
violates a fundamental public policy.
In addition, strict scrutiny is a flexible rule. To this point, we have examined the
growth of the rule through expansion of the protected class. However, the evolution
of the rule has not been limited to a single dimension. In some areas, the applicability
of strict scrutiny has declined. For example, the Court has pulled back on its
application of strict scrutiny to the free exercise of religion.
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court introduced the strict scrutiny standard to laws that
impinged on the free exercise of religion.264 In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that

256. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 301–02 (1993). See generally Fallon, supra note 255.
257. Fallon, supra note 255.
258. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Winkler, supra note 237, at 798.
259. Winkler, supra note 237, at 799.
260. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
261. Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and
the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2005) (tracing the equal protection roots of strict scrutiny).
262. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
263. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969) (vote); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07
(1963) (religion); Winkler, supra note 237, at 801.
264. 374 U.S. 398.
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a restriction on unemployment benefits if you worked on Saturday was a violation of
the plaintiff’s religious liberty as a Seventh-day Adventist.265 The Supreme Court
required South Carolina to justify the rule under a strict-scrutiny analysis. Building
on Sherbert, the Court began to regularly apply strict scrutiny to Free Exercise
claims.266
The Supreme Court then reconsidered the applicability of strict scrutiny to
religion. In Employment Division v. Smith,267 the Supreme Court was faced with a
similar situation as Sherbert. In Smith, the issue was denial of unemployment benefits
based on religious beliefs. The difference was that in Smith the denial was based on
religiously based drug use.268 The Oregon Supreme Court, based on Sherbert and the
line of cases that followed, upheld the exemption based on free exercise of religion.
The Supreme Court limited the applicability of strict scrutiny. Justice Scalia
wanted to reserve strict scrutiny for laws that were racially discriminatory or curtailed political speech.269 To unleash strict scrutiny on any law that anyone found
religiously troubling would destroy society. 270 Over time, the Supreme Court found
a new equilibrium for strict scrutiny in the context of free exercise.
The Smith decision then prompted Congress to pass the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).271 The RFRA required the federal courts to apply the preSmith rule.272 Although the Court invalidated the federal RFRA as it applied to states,
the give and take between Congress and the Supreme Court resulted in an equilibrium
for the application of a strict-scrutiny standard as it is related to the free exercise of
religion.273 The rule evolved to a more modern bifurcated application. In the context
of free exercise, strict scrutiny will apply when a statute or practice is “an improper
attempt to target.”274
It is important for our purposes to differentiate the Supreme Court’s use of strict
scrutiny in the context of religious liberty and in a more general application. As we
have seen in the evolution of the doctrine from Sherbert to Smith in the area of free

265. Id. at 401–02; see also Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1178, 1181
(2005).
266. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to
allow Amish to end education after eighth grade, the Court applied strict scrutiny); see also
Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Jesse H. Choper,
The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (1986).
267. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
268. Id. at 874.
269. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 255, at 1313.
270. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).
271. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb–4 (2012).
272. Id. § 2000bb(a)(3), (b)(1).
273. Winkler, supra note 237, at 859 (“The Supreme Court did not take well to Congress’s
encroachment on its standard-setting turf, and in City of Boerne v. Flores, [521 U.S. 507, 532–
36 (1997),] the Court invalidated the RFRA to the extent it required strict scrutiny for judicial
review of state laws.”)
274. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
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exercise, strict scrutiny has seen “a troubled history.”275 “In the 1970s and 1980s,
however, the courts granted very few religion-based exemptions to generally applicable laws despite applying strict scrutiny in many decisions.”276 As to religious liberty claims, a study by Christopher Eisgruber and Larry Sager framed the application
of strict scrutiny as “strict in theory but feeble in fact.”277 At the heart of the matter,
only when a law is drafted to “intentionally target religions for discriminatory
treatment” will it see the applicability of strict scrutiny. 278
From our perspective, it is not the applicable standard that is important as much
as the manner of evolution of the rule. If we want to tether the application of the
fundamental public policy rule to an ascertainable standard, then using strict scrutiny
certainly is promising. First, it continues to evolve. The strict scrutiny doctrine is
flexible enough to bring groups into or remove groups from the classification, but it
changes incrementally, providing groups with some degree of certainty.
Recently, the Supreme Court has softened its stance, stating that the fact that strict
scrutiny applies “says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that
determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.”279 Even in its current
state of application, the positivism of strict scrutiny would ensure compliance.
Further, if we examine Bob Jones through this lens, the result is consistent with
the actual outcome. We realize that with a data point of one (the Bob Jones case)
there is a hefty amount of skepticism in this type of analysis. Nonetheless, if the
question is whether a tax-exempt entity can maintain a racially discriminatory policy,
then would any policy survive strict scrutiny? If we are correct, then the fundamental
public policy doctrine would import the strict-scrutiny standard since this is a class
affected by the standard. There is no compelling state interest in maintaining racially
discriminatory admission standards.
The conflating problem with the analysis is that a version of strict scrutiny would
apply to the exercise of religious freedom. However, under Smith, laws that
incidentally burden religion are not to receive strict scrutiny. 280 Only when a statute
“single[s] out religiously motivated conduct for governmental regulation” will we
apply strict scrutiny.281 As long as the law is not intentionally discriminating against
a religion, it most likely will be upheld.282
Thus, in Bob Jones, since the conduct is not of a class that rises to strict scrutiny,
only the racially motivated component would persist under our analysis. This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s view post-Smith. Other cases support
this approach. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,283 the Supreme Court was faced

275. Winkler, supra note 237, at 858–59.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 859 (quoting Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability
of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1245, 1247 (1994)).
278. Id. at 859.
279. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1994).
280. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–89 (1990); Fallon,
supra note 255, at 1269.
281. Fallon, supra note 255, at 1268–69.
282. Winkler, supra note 237, at 797.
283. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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with the situation of discrimination based on sexual orientation.284 The Boy Scouts
claimed free-expression rights, and the plaintiff claimed discrimination based on
sexual orientation.285 The case was decided pre-Obergefell, and the case was not
about tax exemption. However, consistent with our interpretation of using strict
scrutiny as the proxy for fundamental public policy, the Supreme Court allowed the
Boy Scouts to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 286
However, because the boundaries are so well-defined, strict scrutiny applies to a
narrow pool of individuals. The purpose behind the strict-scrutiny standard seems to
be to provide a voice to disenfranchised groups that otherwise lack political voice. 287
The Supreme Court uses the standard to protect that group from discriminatory
behavior, usually long-standing. Within the context of Bob Jones and the application
of the fundamental public policy doctrine, this overlay seems particularly apt.
Moreover, even after a group is added to the standard, the group can be reexamined
as societal preferences change.288
Fundamental policy public under this heuristic would not cover all potentially
harmful behavior that goes against public policy. For example, discrimination based
on gender or sexual orientation would not be covered under this standard.289 The
rigidity of the standard also often lags far behind societal preferences. For example,
in Obergefell, the Supreme Court did not decide the standard of scrutiny it applied
to the marriage statutes in the context of same-sex marriage.290 The Supreme Court
did use signals of strict scrutiny by calling the right a fundamental right. However,
the Court did not clarify whether it was referring to the right to marry, the rights of
LGBT individuals, or something else altogether. There has been much criticism of
the Supreme Court for failing to articulate a standard.291
Assume that post-Obergefell, the IRS believes that it is required to act against
institutions that violate fundamental public policy as determined by groups to which

284. Id. at 644.
285. Id.
286. Nicholas A. Mirkay, Is It “Charitable” To Discriminate?: The Necessary Transformation of Section 501(c)(3) Into the Gold Standard for Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 45, 68.
287. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969); Libby Adler, The Gay Agenda, 16 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 147, 177 n.103 (2009) (“This comes up in the California marriage case, as well.
One of the dissents disputes the finding of a suspect class and the application of strict scrutiny
in part because ‘the gay and lesbian community does not lack political power.’” (quoting In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 466 (Cal. 2008)); Note, State Restrictions on Municipal
Elections: An Equal Protection Analysis, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1491, 1494 (1980).
288. But see David Schraub, Post-Racialism and the End of Strict Scrutiny, 92 IND. L.J.
599, 618 (2017) (“In practice, no case has even contemplated (much less seriously threatened)
the removal of a classification which previously received strict scrutiny from the ranks of
‘suspect classifications.’”).
289. For example, many argue that the IRS should have a broader policy. See David A.
Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice, and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil
Rights Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 BYU L. REV. 167, 169; Brennen, supra
note 85, at 391; Mirkay, supra note 286, at 103.
290. See generally Nan D. Hunter, A Deer in Headlights: The Supreme Court, LGBT
Rights, and Equal Protection, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1121 (2015).
291. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 24, at 107; Yoshino, supra note 3, at 172.
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the strict-scrutiny standard would apply. The IRS denies the Boy Scouts their tax
exemption because the proxy for fundamental public policy has now switched to a
strict-scrutiny analysis arguably after Obergefell.292 From the Boy Scouts’
perspective, there is no clear signal that they have violated the fundamental public
policy overlay. But equipoise is the signal by the Supreme Court that they are outside
of societal norms and mores. Would the Boy Scouts be surprised by an IRS
challenge? It would be hard to believe they would be.
As one can see, the use of the strict scrutiny standard requires time and
consideration by the Supreme Court. This then supports the conclusion in Bob Jones
that the fundamental public policy standard requires a clear harmonization of societal
preferences. Additionally, the standard provides a preference in favor of rescinding
the discriminatory behavior over religious liberty. But there are limits on the
standard. For example, the Supreme Court is not always clear in the applicable
standard of review nor does the standard cover all types of discrimination. If a more
inclusive standard is desired, we would propose using the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
B. Civil Rights Act of 1964
The fundamental public policy rule is not amenable solely to traditional
constitutional law frameworks, however. 293 Scholars such as David Brennen, for
example, have recommended using the more expansive Civil Rights Act of 1964 for
the applicable testing standard.294 In order to attempt to stay within a constitutional
law frame, they acknowledge that the Civil Rights Act would only apply to a private
actor if it receives federal financial assistance. 295
This line of reasoning has failed to be persuasive because the Court has yet to find
the providing of a tax exemption as the functional equivalent of federal financial
assistance.296 Brennen and others are trying to overlay the Civil Rights Act on the
rules of 501(c) in a similar fashion as the fundamental public policy doctrine. 297 This
approach faces many hurdles as it enters into the difficult debate as to whether or not
a tax exemption is a subsidy. Neither scholars nor courts have come to a majority
position.298
For our purposes, however, the constitutional constraints are irrelevant. We do
not suggest that tax-exempt organizations are in all circumstances bound by the Civil
Rights Act; rather, we propose that for the purposes of creating a taxonomy for the
boundary of the fundamental public policy doctrine, the use of the Civil Rights Act
as a proxy fits well within the legal reasoning of Bob Jones. By using the Civil Rights
Act, rather than Treasury discretion, to establish a framework for the fundamental
public policy rule, we avoid various objections and problems. If we were proposing

292. Cf. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (declining to revoke the
exemption because sexual orientation was not a protected class subject to strict scrutiny).
293. Brennen, supra note 289, at 171–72; Mirkay, supra note 286, at 75.
294. Brennen, supra note 287, at 171–72.
295. Id.
296. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 462 (D.D.C. 1972); Mirkay, supra note
286, at 76–78.
297. See generally Brennen, supra note 289; Mirkay, supra note 286.
298. See supra note 14.

1214

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:1175

adding the Civil Rights Act as another standard, then we would face the existing
shortfalls in Brennen’s arguments. Instead, if the purpose of the fundamental public
policy doctrine is to override the charitable exemption once an organization is outside
the bounds of public mores or norms, then the Civil Rights Act is an important proxy.
The Civil Rights Act has created a large body of cases and, as a result, would
provide many data points to help sort out what constitutes a fundamental public
policy.299 By utilizing the vast case law in the Civil Rights Act, charities will know
when they are approaching the boundaries of the standard. Moreover, the standard
shifts over time with societal preferences. As we pointed out earlier, if our goal is to
allow charities to act without concern to an unknown standard and we want that
standard to be flexible, the Civil Rights Act shows promise as a proxy.
The Civil Rights Act may not represent a perfect match for what the Court meant
by fundamental public policy, of course. It currently only protects individuals from
discrimination based on race, color, national or ethnic origin, religion, sex, age, and
disability.300 There are various discriminatory behaviors that are outside of the Civil
Rights Act. For example, neither sexual orientation nor marital status is covered by
the Act.301 Additionally, there are carve outs or fixed exemptions built into the Civil
Rights Act. For example, a school can discriminate based on sex if it is part of the
historic educational mission.302
As it stands, the limitations of the Civil Rights Act as a proxy could be explained
through the following example. Suppose that a religiously affiliated educational
institution refuses to hire a woman as provost because of its religious doctrine.
Although Title IX of the Civil Rights Act proscribes discrimination based on gender,
it may permit an exemption in this case. The interpretive problem is framed as
follows: is that exemption a statement of public policy, which would thus function
as a carve-out of Bob Jones fundamental public policy, or is that exemption
permissible because without strict scrutiny, free exercise controls? 303 It would seem
that under Bob Jones, the fact that Congress exempted out this behavior would cut
in favor of the institution. Moreover, if Congress removed the exemption from Title
IX, it would be a strong signal that this is not permitted under the fundamental public
policy doctrine.

299. For example, there are enough cases that various empirical studies can be conducted
discussing success rates based on different plaintiff characteristics. Michael J. Songer, Decline
of Title VII Disparate Impact: The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of
Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247 (2005); Vincent James Strickler, Green-Lighting
Brown: A Cumulative-Process Conception of Judicial Impact, 43 GA. L. REV. 785, 810 (2009);
see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (listing other cases in which Congress amended Title VII to comply with its “broad
remedial purpose”).
300. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); see also Brennen,
supra note 289; Mirkay, supra note 286. For a discussion of each category, see S. REP. No.
88-872 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2356.
301. Brennen, supra note 289, at 169.
302. See David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217
(2005).
303. Ralph D. Mawdsley & Steven Permuth, Bob Jones University v. United States: Public
Policy and Religious Educational Institutions, 1 ED. L. REP. 745, 749–51 (1982).
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As one can see, these restrictions may cut both ways. On one hand, one might
believe that the Civil Rights Act is not inclusive enough to capture what may be
considered a Bob Jones violation of the fundamental public policy doctrine. For example, Obergefell shows that although discrimination based on sexual orientation is
not covered by the Civil Rights Act, according to the majority, it rises to a similar
standard. The Civil Rights Act as a proxy, in that case, may not be inclusive enough.
On the other hand, the finite application of the Civil Rights Act is exactly the type
of standard that must be in place in order to have a clear guideline for charitable
action. The fact that Congress has not acted to include groups in the Civil Rights Act
and the exemption of some groups from the Act are clear indications of public
opinion. The purpose as articulated in Bob Jones of the fundamental public policy
exemption is not to be a test against contemporaneous societal norms or mores but
against established ones. The Supreme Court used many factors in determining when
an action crossed the threshold. Thus, the Civil Rights Act, with all of its perceived
limitations, demonstrates its promise as a proxy.
Moreover, a denial of exemption by the IRS for violating fundamental public
policy will end up in courts. In the ultimate balancing test between free exercise and
the discriminatory behavior, the Supreme Court will be faced with the determination
of priority of protections. When we proposed using the strict scrutiny standard, the
balance tilted in favor of denying the exemption because discrimination that rises to
applicability of strict scrutiny takes priority. Here, we cannot rely on that de facto
determination. Therefore, this will be a true balancing test. The violation of the Civil
Rights Act allows the Supreme Court to use it as a foundation for determining the
public opinion.
C. Treasury Blacklist
To this point, we have articulated two standards that could be used to define
fundamental public policy. First, we analyzed a strict scrutiny standard, which would
be based on judicial interpretation: the Supreme Court would add a class to the
standard and have to maintain a class within the standard. Second, we looked to
congressional action through the Civil Rights Act. In this section, we look to an
executive-based standard as defined by the Treasury Department. Here we argue that
the Treasury should use a sure shipwreck to allow and encourage compliant behavior.
By maintaining a blacklist of impermissible discrimination, tax-exempt entities
would have clear guidance on compliance.
One reason we advocate for a potentially more expansive view is because of the
limitations on the prior standards. Whether those limitations are positive or negative
depends on the amount of additional regulation charities should be subject to. If the
goal of fundamental public policy is to prohibit tax-exempt entities from receiving
an exemption when they act outside of public norms or mores, then a more expansive
interpretation of what constitutes fundamental public policy may be warranted.
Under the Yoshino and Tribe interpretation of Obergefell, discrimination based
on sexual orientation would violate the fundamental public policy doctrine. Churches
and other religious entities would necessarily be protected from losing their
exemptions anyway, as we have discussed above. However, Bob Jones itself makes
clear that religiously affiliated institutions do not enjoy the same level of exemption
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from the fundamental public policy doctrine. 304 A religious school’s discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation would violate the equal dignity of the individual.
Additionally, under this most expansive taxonomy, single-gender schools may also
violate the standard.
As it is evident, a standard Treasury blacklist is the most fluid of our proposed
standards, requiring charities to continue to monitor the landscape while, at the same
time, providing them with a clear guide to current public policy standards. This
progressive standard ultimately could prove the most enlightened. For example,
assume that a single-sex school discriminates against transgender individuals. In
order to not deal with the accommodation of these individuals as related to bathroom
facilities, locker room facilities, sports teams, and the like, the school will not admit
such students. Under current rules, transgender students are not subject to strict
scrutiny nor, currently, are they subject to the Civil Rights Act. 305 Thus, under the
two prior safe harbors, the IRS would be unable to deny or revoke the school’s
exemption.
However, the legal treatment of transgender individuals is rapidly changing. In
ten years, discrimination against transgender individuals will likely seem as offensive as racial discrimination is today. Currently, transgender individuals are suing
educational institutions for violations under Title IX.306 Although the cases have been
dismissed to date, there is no guarantee the courts in the future will not change their
interpretation of Title IX.307
In fact, the treatment of transgender individuals illustrates why a Treasury
blacklist may be the best way to approach the fundamental public policy rule. While
transgender individuals have not yet had success at the judicial or legislative
branches, on May 13, 2016, the Obama administration sent a “Dear Colleague” letter
to public schools, announcing that it believed that Title IX protected gender
identity.308 Because of the flexibility the executive branch enjoys, it could move far
more quickly than Congress or the courts.

304. See supra notes 30–55 and accompanying text.
305. See generally Harper Jean Tobin & Jennifer Levi, Securing Equal Access to SexSegregated Facilities for Transgender Students, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 301 (2013).
306. See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D.
Va. 2015), rev’d, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.); EEOC
v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 594 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Johnston
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
307. In fact, in one case, the transgender plaintiff had some success. The Fourth Circuit
held that Title IX was ambiguous with respect to gender identity, and thus accorded deference
to the Department of Education, which argued that Title IX required schools to allow
transgender students to use the restroom associated with their gender identity. G.G. ex
rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 721 (4th Cir. 2016). Initially, the Supreme Court stayed the Court of Appeals’s mandate pending the filing of a writ of certiorari.
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016). But after a change in
the Presidency, the Department of Justice and Education in February of 2017 issued new Title
IX guidance clarifying protections for transgender students. In light of the intervening actions,
the Supreme Court vacated the stay and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit, Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.). Still, the question of
whether Title IX covers transgender individuals may be resolved soon.
308. Dear Colleague Letter of Transgender Students from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant
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The use of the equal dignity proxy allows the IRS to prohibit certain behaviors.
Because of the fluid nature of the standard, it would require more notice by the IRS.
For example, the IRS can continue to maintain a list of what it considers “protected
classes” in order create compliance by charities. This would allow charities to either
have a safe-harbor or challenge the denial of exemption. Rather than be behind the
curve and wait until it is painfully obvious that the behavior was inappropriate, the
IRS can achieve the same result quicker.
For example, if the goal is to not permit charities to enjoy tax-exempt status when
they violate fundamental public policy, then time should not be the proxy as it was
in Bob Jones. There are at least two possible ways that the IRS could determine when
to include a group. The IRS, in the most expansive approach, would produce yearly
lists of prohibited behavior. The concession for compliance with the public opinion
portion of the standard, the IRS would have to self-select. If a more rigorous process
was necessitated, the IRS could go through a yearly notice and comment process.
Through the administrative state a thoughtful inclusion of groups would occur.
Because we would be relying on interest group politics to prevent a group from
entering the list before there was alignment, we would not be adding groups or
removing groups before we had a proxy of public opinion. 309
A collateral consequence of this approach would be that the IRS is no longer using
prosecutorial discretion to opt out of decision making. One of the main criticisms of
the current ad hoc approach is that there is no clear understanding outside of race
when or if the IRS will use the fundamental public policy stick. Theoretically, the
IRS could use this stick at any time for any behavior. Under our sure shipwreck
approach, the IRS would be explicit in its decision making.
Giving Treasury the authority to determine what constitutes a fundamental public
policy is not, of course, a perfect solution to the problem. In the first instance, it
deposits significant authority in the Treasury Department, which alone would get to
decide what types of discrimination violate public policy.
We are not put off by this, however, because the Treasury Department already
determines fundamental public policy. The IRS determines whether to grant and
whether to revoke tax-exempt status. While would-be tax-exempt organizations can
challenge its decision when it decides that they do not qualify because they violate a
fundamental public policy, the public cannot directly challenge the IRS’s

Sec’y for Human Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 13, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov
/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V99
-2GZT]. But since these executive orders are not binding on future administrations, policy
perceived as beneficial can be rolled back. The Obama-era executive order was rescinded by
President Trump. Jeremy W. Peters, Jo Becker & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Rescinds
Rules on Bathrooms for Transgender Students, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/devos-sessions-transgender-students-rights
.html [https://perma.cc/GGM9-Q8CA].
309. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996); Jonathan R.
Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An
Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988); Susannah Camic Tahk,
Public Choice Theory and Earmarked Taxes, 68 TAX L. REV. 755 (2015).

1218

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 92:1175

determinations. Our proposal leaves that authority with the IRS, but adds a level of
transparency—the IRS has to say, in advance, what type of discrimination it views
as violating public policy. With that list available to the public, the IRS must justify
and explain its decisions.
In the second instance, some may question whether the standard has gone too far
or not far enough. Some might advocate that this approach does not goes far enough.
We should not be tacitly supporting actions that are against public policy. By
definition the disenfranchised group does not have political voice, and that is the
reason for the equal protection standard. Thus, by a more proactive standard, we are
encouraging social change. In our prior example, the school would be denied taxexemption because of its effects on the transgender individuals.
Problematic with that approach is that it requires us to predict where societal
norms and mores will be in the future. As we can see in the context of strict scrutiny,
there are not even constants in this highest constitutional standard. By pushing the
standard forward based on a contemporaneous understanding of the problem without
the benefit of time, a deleterious standard might apply.
CONCLUSION
We find it interesting that Obergefell, a case that has no direct link to taxes,310 has
provoked such a public and emotional debate over tax status. And yet it has. Taxexempt status appears to be important in the public mind, and the potential for losing
that tax-exempt status has proven to have real political salience. While the American
public at largely likely does not understand the intricacies of the Bob Jones decision
or the contours of the fundamental public policy rule, they realize that Obergefell
changed something. As a result, unfounded or not, the potential of the Court’s
decision in Obergefell to cause religious organizations that oppose homosexuality to
lose their tax-exempt status has mobilized a significant swath of Americans.
And fears that churches will lose their tax exemptions in the wake of Obergefell
are entirely unfounded. Notwithstanding the fundamental public policy rule,
churches that discriminate against LGBT individuals will not lose their tax exemptions. Whether the Constitution provides for church autonomy or churches merely
have the same associational rights as others, Bob Jones is inapplicable to churches
that oppose same-sex marriage. Obergefell’s holding that marriage is a fundamental
right does nothing to change that conclusion.

310. The federal tax consequences of same-sex marriage came two years earlier, when
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), struck down section three of the Defense of
Marriage Act. At that point, the federal government could recognize same-sex couples as
married for tax purposes, see Herzig, supra note 159; nothing about Obergefell supplemented
or otherwise affected that conclusion. The limited tax application of Obergefell is in the area
of state/federal law conformity issues like employee benefits. See David J. Herzig, The Tax
Implications of Today’s Supreme Court Same-Sex Marriage Decision, TAXPROF BLOG (June
26, 2015), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2015/06/herzig-the-tax-implications-of-todays
-supreme-court-same-sex-marriage-decision.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20161024025
926/http://taxprof.typepad.com//taxprof_blog/2015/06/herzig-the-tax-implications-of-todayssupreme-court-same-sex-marriage-decision.html].
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For religiously affiliated institutions, however, the calculus is different. Although
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Obergefell does not mention the fundamental public
policy requirement, its holding may represent a shift in fundamental public policy. If
its holding—or its embrace of equal dignity—means that discrimination based on
sexual orientation violates a fundamental public policy, religious schools and other
religiously affiliated organizations face a loss of exemption if they discriminate.
Even where that discrimination is based on religious beliefs, the Supreme Court has
held that the interest of the government in encouraging fundamental public policies
allows revocation or denial of exemption.
Moreover, even if Obergefell does not mark a shift in fundamental public policy,
that shift will happen at some point. The problem is, under the current diachronic
fundamental public policy regime, tax-exempt organizations have no way to know,
ex ante, what will violate a fundamental public policy. Only after violation has
occurred, and exemption has been revoked, do the contours of fundamental public
policy become clear.
Although punishing bad actors may be emotionally satisfying, we believe that the
purpose of the fundamental public policy is to discourage such behavior in advance.
As a result, we have recommended three safe harbor regimes that will allow
religiously affiliated tax-exempt organizations to know what kinds of discrimination
are incompatible with tax exemption before they must act. Tying the definition of
fundamental public policy to strict scrutiny, to the Civil Rights Act, or to equal
protection would work. In the end, though, we believe that the flexibility attendant
to equal protection, mixed with the nimbleness that the Treasury Department would
enjoy in crafting a blacklist of prohibited discrimination, would provide the best and
most effective safe harbor regime.
It would also require little additional work. Presumably, the Treasury Department
already has a sense of what it believes violates fundamental public policy and weighs
exemption applications against that sense. To create the blacklist, it would merely
have to formally list those criteria, an exercise that would eliminate arbitrariness in
the application of the list and would provide certainty to tax-exempt organizations.
And where it believed fundamental public policy was shifting, or where it believed
that tax-exempt organizations were skirting the rules, it would have the ability to
amend the list.
With the clarification provided by a sure shipwreck rule, religiously affiliated taxexempt organizations would be able to weigh the relative value of their religious
commitments and the cost of following those commitments. The safe harbor would
necessarily not prohibit discrimination, but it would require organizations that
wanted to discriminate to internalize additional costs in making that decision, which
would, in the end, discourage actions that violate public policy while respecting the
religious liberty to act badly.

